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Rethinking the Compatibility of
Moral Rights and Fair Use
Dane S. Ciolino*
In 1990, Congress amended the Copyright Act to recognize limited
federal moral rights of integrity and attribution. Under this legislation,
American visual artists can prevent others from misattributing their works
of art and from altering such works under certain circumstances. These
moral rights, however, are expressly limited by copyright's fair-use
doctrine, a doctrine that permits the otherwise unauthorized use of a
copyrighted work for socially desirable purposes such as criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching, research, or parody. This Article argues
that the fair-use doctrine is inherently incompatible with federal moral
rights. Particularly, federal moral rights and fair use affect different
types of property; federal moral rights and fair use relate to different
types of rights; and federal moral rights and fair use are supported by
different moral justifications. For these reasons and others, this Article
calls for courts to decline Congress's statutory invitation to apply the fair-
use doctrine as a limitation on artists'federal moral rights.
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L Introduction
The moral-rights doctrine preserves for artists limited rights in their
works, even after such works are transferred to others. Although moral
rights vary among the jurisdictions that recognize them, these rights typi-
cally include the continuing right to prevent alterations and misattributions
INCOMPATIBILITY OF MORAL RIGHTS AND FAIR USE
of an artist's work. For example, if Leonardo da Vinci were alive today,
the moral-rights doctrine would, under certain circumstances, give him the
right to prevent the alteration of the Mona Lisa by a parodist who wished
to paint a mustache on the depicted woman's face.' Moreover, Leonardo
could enforce his moral rights regardless of whether he still owned the
tangible painting or the copyright in the underlying work of authorship.
Developed in nineteenth-century France as an element of the artist's
right of personality,2 moral rights traditionally protected an artist's work -
"his spiritual child" - as an outgrowth of his soul.3 Despite the sentimen-
tal appeal of the doctrine, moral rights met formidable resistance in the
United States. Indeed, American courts initially refused to recognize any
moral rights of artists. Indicative of this early hostility toward moral rights
is the reported opinion of one New York court in 1949: "The conception
of 'moral rights' of authors so fully recognized and developed in civil law
countries has not yet received acceptance in the law of the United States.
No such right is referred to by legislation, court decisions or writers. "'
Over the years, however, the United States has retreated considerably from
its early hard-nosed stance against moral rights. Perhaps the most notable
evidence of this American retreat is the Visual Artists' Rights Act of 1990
1. It has become standard fare in moral-rights conversation to discuss the painting of
a mustache on the Mona Lisa. See, e.g., Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of
1990: Toward a Federal Sstem of Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L.
REV. 945, 981 (1990); Geri. J. Yonover, The "Dissing" of Da Vinci: The Imaginary Case of
Leonardo v. Duchamp: Moral Rights, Parody and Fair Use, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 935, 937
(1995) [hereinafter Yonover, "Dissing" of Da rici]; Geri J. Yonover, The Precarious
Balance: Moral Rights, Parody and Fair Use, 14 CARDOZO ARTs & ENT. L.J. 79, 84-85
(1996) [hereinafter Yonover, Precarious Balance]; E. Kenly Ames, Note, Beyond Rogers v.
Koons: A Fair Use Standard for Appropriation, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1473, 1484 (1993);
Jennifer T. Olson, Note, Rights in Fine Art Photography: Through a Lens Darkly, 70 TEX. L.
REV. 1489, 1514 (1992); Laura W. Wooton, Comment, Law for Law's Sake: The Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990, 24 CONN. L. REv. 247, 290 (1991).
2. See, e.g., Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for
the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1, 14 (1988); Russell J.
DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists' Rights in France
and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1, 10-11 (1980); John H. Merryman, The
Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1025 (1976); Martin A. Roeder, The
Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L.
REV. 554, 555 (1940); see also 1 MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGE REPERT, TREATISE ON THE
CIVIL LAW, no. 2549A, pt. 2, at 505-06 (12th ed. 1939) (Louisiana State Law Inst. trans.,
1959) (author's moral right "falls within the general category of personal rights").
3. SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND
ARTISTIC WORKs: 1886-1986, at 456 (1987).
4. Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 818 (Sup. Ct. 1949)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Vargas v. Esquire, Inc., 164 F.2d 522, 526 (7th Cir. 1947)).
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(VARA).s Although it is not expansive moral-rights legislation in the
continental European tradition, VARA represents the first federal endorse-
ment of moral rights6 inhering in an artist to protect his work after transfer-
ring its physical embodiment and its copyright to another. More particu-
larly, VARA grants artists limited rights of integrity and attribution in their
works of visual art.' Hence, American artists now have the right (1) to
claim authorship of their own works of visual art and to prevent the use of
their names on works that they did not create (right of attribution)' and
(2) to prevent the "distortion, mutilation or modification" of their works
under certain circumstances (right of integrity).9
Despite Congress's recognition of federal integrity and attribution
rights, those rights are significantly more limited than their European
counterparts. Among other limitations, federal moral rights are expressly
subject to copyright's fair-use doctrine.1 Often termed an "equitable rule
of reason,"'" the fair-use doctrine permits users of copyrighted works to
engage in otherwise infringing conduct if their use of the copyrighted work
is "fair" in light of all of the circumstances. 2 Uses favored by the fair-use
5. Visual Artists' Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5128 (1990)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 107, 113, 301, 411, 412, 501, 506 (1994)).
6. For a host of reasons, see infra Parts ll.A, IlI.A, llI.B, VARA attribution and integ-
rity rights are not "true" moral rights of the type long recognized in Europe. Rather, they are
sui generis rights merely analogous to continental moral rights. Nevertheless, most commenta-
tors and courts refer to artists' VARA rights as "moral rights." As a result, this Article refers
to congressionally enacted VARA rights as either "moral rights" or "federal moral rights."
To distinguish VARA rights from their European counterparts, however, this Article refers
to continental moral rights as either "true moral rights," "continental moral rights," "European
moral rights," or "traditional moral rights."
7. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (1994). A "work of visual art" includes a painting,
drawing, print, sculpture, or photograph (if the photograph is produced for "exhibition pur-
poses"), existing in a single copy or in an enumerated limited edition of two hundred or fewer
signed copies. See id. § 101 (providing definitions).
8. Id. § 106A(a)(1)-(2).
9. Id. § 106A(a)(3).
10. See id. §§ 106A(a), 107.
11. E.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984) (stating that
fair-use section of Copyright Act enables court "to apply an 'equitable rule of reason' analysis
to particular claims of infringement"); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65-66 (1976) (fair-use
doctrine "is an equitable rule of reason"); S. REP. No. 94-473, at 62 (1975) (same). But see
WILLAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 4-5 (2d ed. 1995) (arguing
that fair use did not develop as equitable rule of reason given that law courts contributed to
development of doctrine). However, the term "equitable" in the context of a fair-use rule of
reason analysis connotes "fairness" rather than "equity" in the sense of the law-equity dichot-
omy.
12. See infra Part II.B.
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doctrine include those for purposes of "criticism," "comment," "news
reporting," "teaching," "research," and "parody."13 Courts and commenta-
tors have long struggled with the contours of the fair-use doctrine, one
court branding it "the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright."14
While the doctrine is troublesome in general, it is especially so in its
application to moral rights. This is so because federal moral rights and the
fair-use doctrine are manifestly incompatible for a number of doctrinal and
practical reasons. First, fair use is a doctrine born of intellectual property
law for the purpose of permitting certain nonrivalrous uses of intangible
copyrighted works. But the federal moral rights adopted by Congress have
little relationship to intellectual property at all; rather, they govern the
relationship of artists with tangible property. 5 Second, fair use is a doc-
trine that permits certain uses of a work in preference to a copyright
owner's otherwise valid copyright exclusive rights. But the federal moral
rights adopted by Congress - rights which fair use may trump - are rights
of an entirely different order from copyright exclusive rights. Namely,
federal moral rights are either "personal" rights or "personal property"
rights, both of which arguably deserve greater respect (and hence less
deference to fair use) than ordinary copyright exclusive rights. 6 Third, fair
use is a doctrine justified largely by the consequentialist goal underlying
copyright law in general: that of promoting the creation of new works of
authorship. But federal moral rights exist for reasons that are decidedly
nonconsequentialist - namely, to promote artistic respect and artifact
preservation. Applying fair use to limit federal moral rights would disre-
gard these nonconsequentialist goals without furthering any of the conse-
quentialist goals of the fair-use doctrine.' 7 Finally, and on a more practical
level, the statutory factors that guide the fair-use analysis - factors de-
signed to further the economic goals of copyright - simply do not work
when applied to a "use" of tangible property protected by federal moral
rights. 1
8
13. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994); see, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 580-83 (1994) (parody); Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
541-69 (1985) (criticism or comment); Allen v. Academic Games League, 89 F.3d 614, 617
(9th Cir. 1996) (teaching); American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 920
(2d Cir. 1994) (research), cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 592 (1995); Diamond v. Am-Law
Publ'g, 745 F.2d 142, 147 (2d Cir. 1984) (news reporting).
14. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam).
15. See infra Part rmr.A.
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. See infra Part Il.C.
18. See infra Part II.D.
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This Ai-ticle rethinks the compatibility of fair use and moral rights.
After briefly surveying the historical development of the moral-rights and
fair-use doctrines, it critically evaluates Congress's adoption of artists'
rights analogous to continental moral rights and its ill-conceived attempt to
limit those rights through copyright's fair-use doctrine. Concluding that
fair use and federal moral rights are inherently incompatible, this Article
ends with a call for courts to decline Congress's statutory invitation to limit
federal moral rights through fair use.
I. Historical Background of Moral Rights and Fair Use
A. Moral Rights
1. Moral Rights in Europe
Moral rights, or droit moral,19 evolved in France" and elsewhere in
continental Europe during the nineteenth century. 2' Intended to protect the
19. Doris E. Long & Anthony D'Amato, Introduction to INTERNATIONAL INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY 8 (Anthony D'Amato & Doris E. Long eds., 1996) ("In France
the concept is referred to as 'droit moral,' in Germany, 'urheberpersonlichkeitsrecht,' in the
United States, 'moral rights or inherent rights.'").
20. See DaSilva, supra note 2, at 5 (stating that moral rights were created by judges
in France); Merryman, supra note 2, at 1026 (same).
21. For a more detailed discussion of the development of moral rights in Europe,
see generally Harold C. Streibich, The Moral Right of Ownership to Intellectual Property:
Part I - From the Beginning to the Age of Printing, 6 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1975)
[hereinafter Streibich, Part 11 (detailing development of moral rights from beginning of
time to Renaissance); and Harold C. Streibich, The Moral Right of Ownership to Intellectual
Property: Part I - From the Age of Printing to the Future, 7 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 45
(1976) [hereinafter Streibich, Part 1] (detailing development of moral rights from Renais-
sance through present). Over the past decade, numerous articles have discussed moral rights
in Europe and the United States. For a sampling of this literature, see Lawrence A. Beyer,
Intentionalism, Art, and the Suppression of Innovation: Film Colorization and the Philosophy
of Moral Rights, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 1011 (1988); Dane S. Ciolino, MoralRights and Real
Obligations: A Property-Law Framework for the Protection of Authors' Moral Rights,
69 TuL. L. REV. 935 (1995); Edward J. Damich, Moral Rights Protection and Resale
Royalties for Visual Art in the United States: Development and Current Status, 12 CARDOZO
ARTs & ENT. L.J. 387 (1994); Damich, supra note 1; Damich, supra note 2; Robert A.
Gorman, Federal Moral Rights Legislation: The Need for Caution, 14 NOVA L. REV. 421
(1990); John M. Kernochan, Moral Rights in U.S. Theatrical Productions: A Possible
Paradigm, 17 CoLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 385 (1993); Otto W. Konrad, A Federal Recog-
nition of Performance Art Author Moral Rights, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1579
(1991); Roberta R. Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage
Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1985); Merryman, supra note 2; Neil Netanel, Alienability
Restrictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy in United States and Continental
Copyright Law, 12 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Netanel, Alienability
Restrictions]; Neil Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions and Enhancement of Author
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personal rights of artists as distinguished from their economic rights,22 the
moral-rights doctrine was developed almost entirely by the French judi-
ciary.' Although often termed a "doctrine," moral-rights law is more an
assemblage of artist-related rights than a unitary body of law.' While there
are considerable differences among the particular moral rights recognized
in different jurisdictions, the most commonly recognized are the right of
attribution and the right of integrity.25
Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 347 (1993) [hereinafter Netanel,
Normative Evaluation]; Roeder, supra note 2; Dan Rosen, Artists' Moral Rights: A European
Evolution, An American Revolution, 2 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 155 (1983); Raymond
Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors Under French Law, 16 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 465 (1968); William Strauss, The Moral Right of the Author, 4 AM. J. CoMP. L.
506 (1955); Yonover, "Dissing" of Da Vinci, supra note 1; Yonover, Precarious Balance,
supra note 1, at 79; Brett Sirota, Note, The Visual Artists Rights Act: Federal Versus
State Moral Rights, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 461 (1992); and Patrick G. Zabatta, Note, Moral
Rights and Musical Works: Are Composers Getting Berned?, 43 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1095
(1992).
22. Roeder, supra note 2, at 554-55.
23. Merryman, supra note 2, at 1026 (noting that "[t]his is in itself remarkable, since
one of the most treasured tenets of the conventional wisdom about the civil law is that law
is made by legislators and executives, not by judges."). In 1957, the French legislature
enacted moral-rights legislation, which remains law today. See Law No. 57-298 of March
11, 1957, J.0., Mar. 14, 1957, art. 19, p. 2723, amended by Law No. 85-660 of July 3,
1985, J.0., July 4, 1985, p. 7495, translated in UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCIENTIFIC AND
CULTURAL ORG., COPYRIGHT LAws AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, France section, item
1, art. 19 (1992) [hereinafter French Moral Rights Legislation].
24. See Arthur S. Katz, The Doctrine of Moral Right and American Copyright
Law - A Proposal, 24 S. CAL. L. REv. 375, 390-91 (1951) ("mhe term [moral right]
enjoys almost as many definitions as it has adherents."); Kwall, supra note 21, at 12 (stating
that "countries that have adopted the moral right do not endorse a uniform position with
respect to these matters"); id. at 97-100 (listing characteristics associated with moral rights
of thirty-five countries and thereby illustrating lack of uniformity); Merryman, supra note
2, at 1027 ("The moral right of the artist is actually a composite right."); Strauss, supra note
21, at 536 (discussing lack of moral rights uniformity among countries); James M. Treece,
American Law Analogues of the Author's "Moral Right," 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 487, 505
(1968).
25. Moral rights, in addition to the attribution and integrity rights, include the right
of "divulgation" and the right of "withdrawal." The right of divulgation provides that the
"author alone shall have the right to divulge his work." French Moral Rights Legislation,
supra note 23, art. 19. The divulgation right includes "the decision to sell, unveil, or by
any other means make his work public." DaSilva, supra note 2, at 17. In contrast to the
integrity, paternity, and withdrawal rights, the right of divulgation provides protection for
the artist prior to publication. See Treece, supra note 24, at 487. This right is personal to
the artist, see DaSilva, supra note 2, at 2, discretionary, see Sarraute, supra note 21, at 467
(artist has sole discretion to divulge or to withhold work), and exclusive, see DaSilva, supra
note 2, at 17-21.
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The right of attribution generally consists of (1) the right of the artist
to be identified as the author of any work that he actually created, and (2)
the right of the artist to prevent the use of his name as the author of a work
that he did not create.' The French legislature has characterized the attri-
bution right as the artist's right to "respect for his name, his authorship. "I
As a component of the artist's personality, the right of attribution attaches
to the author himself,'s is perpetual,29 and is nontransferable.'
The right of integrity, perhaps the most notable component of droit
mora!,31 protects the author's reputation and prevents others from deform-
ing, destroying,"2 or otherwise altering the artist's work. 3 In so doing, it
The rights of withdrawal and modification give the author the right to "correct or
retract" a work after its publication. French Moral Rights Legislation, supra note 23, art.
32. Moreover, the author has the right to purchase any reproductions of his work created
under license from him. See Roeder, supra note 2, at 561. The withdrawal and modifica-
tion rights give the author the ability to monitor the presentation of his works to the public.
See Damich, supra note 2, at 23-24.
The rights of withdrawal and modification, however, are awkward to exercise. The
author must "indemnify the transferee beforehand for the loss that the correction or retrac-
tion may cause him." French Moral Rights Legislation, supra note 23, art. 32. Likewise,
upon republication after retraction the author must "offer his exploitation rights in the first
instance to the transferee he originally chose, and under the conditions originally deter-
mined." Id. Also, these rights exist only as long as the artist retains all property rights in
the work. See DaSilva, supra note 2, at 25. For these reasons, the rights of withdrawal
and modification have limited usefulness and are rarely employed. See Sarraute, supra note
21, at 477.
Other, less common moral rights have occasionally been recognized in some jurisdic-
tions. For example, some commentators have identified a moral right to prevent "any other
violation" of the author's personality. See Roeder, supra note 2, at 573; Strauss, supra note
21, at 514. Others have considered the moral-rights doctrine to be a fluid concept whose
contours cannot be fully delineated. See Streibich, Part i1, supra note 21, at 82 ("The
precise bounds of such rights will be determined by innovative advocates and enlightened
judges in the exercise of reason.").
26. DaSilva, supra note 2, at 26.
27. French Moral Rights Legislation, supra note 23, art. 6.
28. Id.
29. Id. The perpetual nature of the right of attribution is demonstrated by the author's
ability to donate it mortis causa.
30. Id.
31. DaSilva, supra note 2, at 30-31.
32. But see Roeder, supra note 2, at 569 (arguing that destruction is not part of right
of integrity because destruction, unlike deformation, does not present author to public as
creator of work not his own).
33. Damich, supra note 2, at 7; DaSilva, supra note 2, at 31-32; Merryman, supra
note 2, at 1035.
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gives the author the "right to respect for ... his work,"' and guarantees
that his work will remain an authentic representation of his artistic personal-
ity - even after he has sold or otherwise transferred the physical manifesta-
tion of the work and its copyright. The right of integrity is well illustrated
by the French case of Buffet c. Fersing s Bernard Buffet painted six panels
of a refrigerator. Considering the six panels to be a unitary work of art,
Buffet signed only one panel. Despite Buffet's intention that the, work
remain intact, a subsequent owner sold off one of its panels. Recognizing
that the alteration harmed Buffet's integrity interest, France's highest court
awarded him damages.3"
Although the attribution right, the integrity right, and other moral
rights have some functional similarities with property rights, 7 continental
moral rights are decidedly personal. Moral rights protect an artist's work
as an outgrowth of his soul and, hence, are a component of his personal-
ity. 8 Thus, when that work is criticized, altered, or destroyed, so too is
the artist.39 For these reasons, French law assures that moral rights relating
to an art work "shall be attached to [the author's] person. "I Even when
an employee-artist creates a work for his employer, the employee has moral
rights relating to the work that vest in his person.4" Similarly, because
moral rights are among the rights of personality, artists are incapable of
transferring them.42 Thus, a transfer of the physical embodiment of an
artist's work (such as a painting or a sculpture) does not thereby transfer
the artists' moral rights in the work. Nor does a transfer of the copyright
34. French Moral Rights Legislation, supra note 23, art. 6.
35. CA Paris, le ch., May 30, 1962, D. Jur. 1962, 570, aft'd, Cass. le civ., July 6,
1965, Gaz. Pal. 1965, 2, pan. jurispr., 126; see Merryman, supra note 2, at 1023.
36. D. Jur. 1962, at 570-71. For an entertaining discussion of this decision, see
Merryman, supra note 2, at 1023 n.1.
37. See Ciolino, supra note 21, at 969-71 (property rights and moral rights both relate
to things, exhibit right to follow, can be enforced against world, can be avoided by dispos-.
session, and can be created and abandoned unilaterally).
38. E.g., RIcKETSON, supra note 3. One commentator has defined one's personality
as "the outward representation of one's innermost self." Katz, supra note 24, at 401.
39. Roeder, supra note 2, at 557 (noting that author of published art work "projects
into the world part of his personality and subjects it to the ravages of public use").
40. French Moral Rights Legislation, supra note 23, art. 6; DaSilva, supra note 2, at
12.
41. French Moral Rights Legislation, supra note 23, art. 1 ("The existence of... a
contract to make a work, or an employment contract shall imply no exception to the
enjoyment of the right recognized .... ").
42. Id. art. 6. See generally Katz, supra note 24, at 406-09 (discussing nontransfer-
able nature of moral rights).
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33 (1997)
in a work effect a transfer of the artists' moral rights. To be sure, many
European jurisdictions expressly prohibit the transfer of moral rights .
43
In an effort to unify European moral-rights law, the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works' (Berne Convention) was
amended in 1928 to include a moral-rights provision. That amendment,
codified in Article 6bis,45 provides that artists have "the right to claim
authorship of the work" (right of attribution), and the right "to object to any
distortion, mutilation or other modification of.. . the said work, which
would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation" (right of integrity).46 Given
that the Berne Convention presently has over one hundred signatories, 47 the
43. Strauss, supra note 21, at 515. While transfer is prohibited in most jurisdictions,
waivers of moral rights are more often permitted. Id. at 517. Waivers do not alienate the
moral right, but merely make it unenforceable.
44. The Berne Convention, now administered by the World Intellectual Property Asso-
ciation, is the oldest of the major international copyright treaties. First negotiated in 1886
for the purpose of protecting "the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works," the
Berne Convention now has over one hundred member states, "including virtually every
highly industrialized country and many developing countries as well." 1 NEIL BOORSTYN,
BOORSTYN ON COPYRIGHT § 1.02, at 1-4 (2d ed. 1994).
45. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORG., PuB. No. 615E GuiDE TO THE BERNE
CONVENTION, art. 6bis (1978) [hereinafter WIPO]. Article 6bis of the Berne Convention
provides:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim the authorship of the work
and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other
derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his
honor or reputation.
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding paragraph
shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic
rights, and shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized by the
legislation of the country where protection is claimed. However, those countries
whose legislation, at the moment of their ratification of or accession to this Act,
does not provide for the protection after the death of the author of all the rights
set out in the preceding paragraph may provide that some of these rights may,
after his death, cease to be maintained.
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall
be governed by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.
Id.
46. Id. See generally 1 BooRsTYN, supra note 44, § 5.07, at 5-21. One commentator
notes: "In the U.C.C. and the Berne Convention, bis indicates a statutory article added to
the original text and 'sandwiched in' so as not to effect the original numbering scheme
(much as §§ 106A and 116A were added to the 1976 Copyright Act subsequent to its
enactment)." MARSHAL A. LFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 8.28[A], at 278
n.328 (2d ed. 1995).
47. See 1 BOORSTYN, supra note 44, § 1.02, at 1-4.
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moral rights of attribution and integrity that developed in post-Revolution-
ary France are now firmly entrenched in international law.'
2. Moral Rights in the United States
While moral rights have flourished in continental Europe, the United
States has been slow to protect artists' noneconomic rights.49 Characteristic
of the early American antagonism toward moral rights is the 1949 decision
in Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church.s' Artist Alfred Crimi painted a
fresco mural on a wall of the Rutgers Presbyterian Church in Manhattan.
When the congregation later painted over "his" mural, Crimi protested and
demanded that the church either restore the mural or remove it at the
church's expense. The court, however, refused to recognize an enforceable
moral right of integrity and held that moral rights are "not supported by the
decisions of our courts."51
Like the Crimi court, most American courts initially refused to recog-
nize moral rights explicitly. Nevertheless, some courts marshaled existing
legal doctrines to provide artists protection somewhat analogous to that
provided by traditional moral-rights regimes. For example, courts used
federal copyright laws and federal unfair-competition law, particularly Sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act,53 to protect rights similar to the moral rights
48. For a general discussion of current moral rights in the European Community, see
ADOLF D=Erz, COPYRIGHT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 66-78 (1978).
49. E.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolu-
tionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REy. 991, 992 (1990) ("Anglo-American exponents
of copyright law and policy have viewed the author's right grudgingly.").
50. 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
51. Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 819 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
52. Damich, supra note 2, at 41-47. The right of integrity is implicated by provisions
relating to derivative works and to musical and cable licenses. See 17 U.S.C. § 11 l(c)(3)
(1994) (cable licenses); id. § 115 (musical licenses); id. § 106(2) (derivative works); id.
§ 203 (termination of transfers); see also WILIAm F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND
PRACTICE 1022 n.12 (1994) ("The right of integrity is quite similar to the § 106(2) right to
prepare derivative works."); Damich, supra note 2, at 41. Likewise, the.right of divulgation
is implicated by the public-performance right, the distribution right and the public-display
right. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3)-(5).
53. The right of attribution is implicated by Section 43 of the Lanham Act, which
provides as follows:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services .... uses in
commerce ... any false designation of origin, false or misleading designation
of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which ... is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or
association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship,
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of integrity and attribution. Likewise, other courts used various state-law
doctrines, including contract law' and the tort theories of defamation,5'
invasion of privacy, 6 and unfair competition,5 in an effort to protect rights
analogous to moral rights.
Beginning in the mid-1970s, however, several states began to enact
legislation intended to protect directly rights analogous to continental moral
rights.58  For example, the New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act
or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities .... shall be
liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be
damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1994). The leading Lanham Act case in this context is Gilliam v.
American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). In Gilliam, the writers of Monty
Python sued under the Lanham Act to prevent the rebroadcast of abbreviated Monty Python's
Flying Circus episodes. Id. at 24. The Second Circuit held that the writers sufficiently
stated a cause of action under Section 43(a) (prohibiting any false designation of origin of
goods and services). Id. at 24-25. Particularly, the court held that what ABC had "repre-
sented to the public as the product of [the Monty Python writers] was actually a mere
caricature of their talents." Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 25. See generally Susan L. Solomon,
Comment, "Monty Python" and the Lanham Act: In Search of the Moral Right, 30 RUTGERS
L. REv. 452 (1977); Comment, Moral Rights for Artists Under the Lanham Act: Gilliam v.
American Broadcasting Cos., 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 595 (1977).
54. Contract law can provide a limited degree of protection to authors. For example,
contractual provisions in the act of sale of an artwork conceivably could reserve to the artist
rights similar to the moral rights of attribution, integrity, divulgation, and withdrawal. See
Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 588 (2d Cir. 1952); Clemens v. Press Publ'g Co., 122
N.Y.S. 206, 208 (App. Div. 1910); Preminger v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 267 N.Y.S.2d
594, 602 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
55. Defamation law can potentially provide a means to redress injury to an author's
professional reputation. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). To be
actionable, the conduct must harm the plaintiff's reputation in the community in which the
defamatory statement was published. Id. Likewise, the author must prove injury to his
professional reputation. See Kwall, supra note 21, at 25. Courts have also used defamation
law to prevent false attribution. See D'Altomonte v. New York Herald Co., 139 N.Y.S.
200, 201-02 (App. Div.), aft'd, 208 N.Y. 596 (1913); Edison v. Viva Int'l, Ltd., 421
N.Y.S.2d 203, 207 (Sup. Ct.), af'd, 70 A.D.2d 379 (App. Div. 1979); Damich, supra note
21, at 391.
56. See Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 127 P.2d 577, 580 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
57. For a discussion of unfair competition causes of action under state law, see Stevens
v. National Broadcasting Co., 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 755, 756 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1966); and Damich, supra note 21, at 395.
58. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-
116s (West 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2154 (West 1995); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 27, § 303 (West 1995); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 85S (Law. Co-op. 1995); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 598, 970 (Michie 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-1 (West 1996);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-2 (Michie 1995); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.01
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directly recognizes the right of integrity and the right of attribution in visual
artworks. 59 Works protected by this statute cannot knowingly be displayed
in a public place in an "altered, defaced, mutilated, or modified form."I
Moreover, an author can compel that his name appear on a work created
by him and also prevent his name from appearing on an altered, defaced,
mutilated, or modified work.61 The remedies available under New York's
statute for violations of the integrity and attribution rights include damages
and injunctive relief.62
Despite such efforts to graft moral rights onto American law, it was
not until the late-1980s, when Congress was considering whether the United
States should accede to the Berne Convention, that the United States first
considered systematically addressing the issue of artists' moral rights.6' As
leading exporters of copyrighted works,' United States citizens were at a
distinct disadvantage in protecting their copyrighted works abroad because
the United States had not acceded to the Berne Convention. In response to
increasing foreign piracy of American works, the United States joined the
Berne Convention as of March 1, 1989.' During the debate over acces-
sion, considerable controversy arose over the necessity of adopting moral-
rights legislation comparable to Article 6bis. Although the original House
bill contained such a provision, Congress ultimately chose not to "expand
or reduce any right of an author" under existing American law.67 Indeed,
Congress somewhat insincerely concluded that moral-rights protection as it
existed at the time of accession was sufficient to comply with the Berne
Convention's droit moral provisions.' Nevertheless, the moral-rights issue
(McKinney 1996); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 2101 (West 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-2
(1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-75.2-3 (1996).
59. N.Y. ARTS & CuLT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (McKinney 1996).
60. Id. § 14.03(1).
61. Id. § 14.03(2).
62. Id. § 14.03(4)(a).
63. Great Britain also resisted adopting continental moral rights. However, in 1988,
it "finally capitulated" and recognized certain moral rights. See Peter Jaszi, Toward a
Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship, - 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 500 n.179.
64. Anne Moebes, Negotiating International Copyright Protection: The United States
and European Community Positions, 14 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 301, 325 (1992).
65. 1 BOORSTYN, supra note 44, § 1.02, at 1-5 to 1-6.
66. See generally Ralph S. Brown, Adherence to the Berne Copyright Convention: The
Moral Rights Issue, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 196 (1988).
67. 2 MELviuL B. Nmfa & DAVID NIMNMR, NIMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.02[C],
at 8D-14 to 8D-16 (1996).
68. Id. § 8D.02[D], at 8D-17 & n.39.
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resurfaced just two years later in 1990 when Congress debated and ulti-
mately passed VARA.69
In VARA, Congress formally recognized federal moral rights similar
to, but more limited than, the rights of integrity and attribution set forth in
the Berne Convention. VARA recognizes a three-fold right of attribution
under which the author has (1) the right to claim authorship of his works
of visual art, (2) the right to prevent the use of his name on works of visual
art that he did not create, and (3) the right to prevent the use of his name
on works that have been distorted, mutilated, or modified, if the use would
be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.7' VARA also recognizes a limited
right of integrity under which the author can prevent (1) any intentional
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of his work of visual art that
would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation, and (2) any intentional or
grossly negligent destruction of a work of recognized stature.7 Although
these rights are not transferrable, they may be waived by the author through
an express writing.' Rights under VARA expire at the end of the calendar
year in which the author dies.73
Although a significant step toward more comprehensive recognition of
moral rights, VARA provides less protection for moral rights than is avail-
able under comparable European moral-rights regimes. Most notably,
VARA protects only "work[s] of visual art," 74 namely, (1) single paintings,
69. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 107, 113, 301,411, 412, 501, 506 (1994); see also
Damich, supra note 1, at 946. VARA was adopted partly out of concern that the United
States needed to adopt some type of federal moral rights provision in order to comply with
the Berne Convention. Id. The House report to VARA characterized the shortcomings of
pre-VARA copyright law with regard to protecting artists' moral rights:
[A]n artist who transfers a copy of his or her work to another may not, absent
a contractual agreement, prevent that person from destroying the copy ....
Further, with respect to modifications of a work, only an artist who retains the
copyright in his or her work is able to invoke title 17 rights in defense of the
integrity of the work, and then only where a modification amounts to the creation
of a derivative work.
H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 8 (1990).
70. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2).
71. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(A)-(B). VARA provides exceptions to the right of integrity with
regard to works incorporated into buildings. See id. § 113(d)(1)(A)-(B). An exception to
the right of integrity also exists with regard to modifications resulting from the "passage of
time or the inherent nature of the materials." Id. § 106A(c)(1). Moreover, the fair-use
doctrine is an exception to these rights. Id. § 107.
72. Id. § 106A(e)(1). To be effective, a visual artist's waiver of rights under VARA
must be written and unambiguous. Id.
73. Id. § 106A(d)(1), (4).
74. Id. § 106A(a).
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drawings, prints, sculptures, or photographic images made "for exhibition
purposes only," and (2) multiple paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, and
certain photographs, in limited editions of two hundred or fewer signed and
numbered copies.75 Additionally, VARA specifically excludes a wide range
of works, including posters, maps, and audiovisual works; merchandising
and advertising items; works made for hire; and works not subject to
copyright protection.76 Finally, and most pertinent to this Article, VARA
specifically provides that the attribution and integrity rights are "[s]ubject
to" copyright's fair-use doctrine.'
B. Fair Use
The fair-use78 doctrine is an affirmative defense to copyright infringe-
ment which, if proved by the defendant,79 justifies his unauthorized copying
75. Id. § 101.
76. Id. VARA specifically excludes:
(A) (i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model,
applied art, motion picture, or-other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspa-
per, periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic publication,
or similar publication;
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, cover-
ing, or packaging material or container;
(iii) any portion or part of any item described in clause (i) or (ii);
(B) any work made for hire; or
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.
Id.
77. Id. § 106A(a) ("Subject to section 107 ... ") (emphasis added); id. § 107
("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted
work .... ") (emphasis added).
78. Some courts have treated as a "fair use" any use that is not substantially similar
to the original work of authorship or that involves use of only noncopyrightable ele-
ments of the plaintiff's work. See generally Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v.
Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1944); Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co.,
135 F.2d 73 (6th Cir. 1943); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49
(2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936); Meredith Corp. v. Harper
& Row Publishers, 378 F. Supp. 6$6 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See generally 3 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 67, § 13.05[A], at 13-155 to 13-156. This Article, however, employs
the more modem meaning of the term "fair use" - that is, a "fair use" is a use that,
although a prima facie infringement of the plaintiff's copyright, is permitted by § 107 of the
Copyright Act.
79. E.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (stating that
fair use is affirmative defense); Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
561 (1985) (same). See generally 3 NIMMER&NIMER, supra note 67, § 13.05, at 13-150;
PATRY, supra note 52, at 725-26. At the trial level, the affirmative defense of "fair use is
a question of fact, appropriate for the jury to decide." Id. at 725 n.27.
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of the copyright owner's expression.' Unlike traditional moral rights that
developed after the French Revolution in civil-law jurisdictions, fair use
emerged more than one hundred years earlier in England.8 English courts
then recognized that permitting subsequent authors to use creatively and
productively an earlier author's otherwise protected expression would
advance learning and further the purpose of English copyright law - to
encourage authors to "Compose and Write useful Books. ,"I
American courts readily adopted the English fair-use doctrine in the
mid-1800s, likewise to further the purpose of copyright law - to promote
"the Progress of Science."'" Originating as a judge-made doctrine in
America, fair use remained so until codified by Congress in § 107 of the
Copyright Act of 1976. 4 As codified, the fair-use defense is a limitation
on all of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner, including reproduc-
tion, adaptation, distribution, public-performance, and public-display
rights . 5 Moreover, the fair-use doctrine is an express limitation on artists'
VARA attribution and integrity rights.'
80. See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY LAW § 4F[3], at 4-176 (1992). On the fair-use defense in general, see
HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT §§ 15.01-15.06 (1995); PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
COPYRIGHT §§ 10.1-10.3 (1989); LEAFFER, supra note 46, § 10, at 317-48; 3 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 67, § 13.05, at 13-150 to 13-271; PATRY, supra note 52, at 718-84; and
PATRY, supra note 11, at 413.
81. See PATRY, supra note 52, at 718 ("Fair use was developed by the courts, initially
the English law and equity courts in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries constru-
ing the 1710 Statute of Anile.").
82. Id. (discussing development of fair use as means of promoting purposes underlying
1710 Statute of Anne); see also Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1259-60 (2d
Cir. 1986) (discussing history of fair use).
83. See PATRY, supra note 52, at 718-19. See generally Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas.
342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, J.). That American courts readily embraced the
English doctrine of fair use is another interesting contrast with their reluctance to adopt the
continental doctrine of droit moral. See supra Part H.A.2.
84. Although Congress enacted the first American copyright statute in 1790, see 1 BOOR-
STYN, supra note 44, § 1.02, at 1-3, fair use was not codified until nearly two hundred years
later when incorporated into the 1976 Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). In codify-
ing fair use in 1976, Congress specifically noted that it did not intend to change the judge-
made law on the subject. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 67, § 13.05, at 13-151. Patry
observes, however, that § 107 did change the law by mandating that courts "must consider all
four statutory factors. In the past, courts considered as few factors as they believed necessary,
and applied whatever factors they believed relevant." PATRY, supra note 52, at 722-23.
85. 17 U.S.C. § 107 ("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 ..... ); id. § 106
("Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive
right to do and to authorize any of the following . . . .") (emphasis added).
86. Id. § 106(A)(a) ("Subject to section 107 .... ") (emphasis added); see also id. § 107
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Defining the fair-use doctrine and surveying its origins are easy;
describing when it applies is not. Many judges have grappled with the
problem of whether the circumstances at bar justified application of the
defense.' Justice Story, the first American jurist to attempt to articulate
when the fair-use doctrine permits otherwise unauthorized copying, set forth
in Folsom v. Marsh an assortment of general considerations rather than a
bright-line rule to resolve fair-use issues:
In short, we must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the
nature of the objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the
materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale,
or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.'
In codifying the fair-use doctrine more than 125 years later, Congress could
be no more specific. Like Justice Story did more than one hundred years
before, Congress set forth a series of nonexclusive 9 "factors" for courts to
consider in resolving fair-use questions, including "the purpose and charac-
ter of the use," the "nature of the copyrighted work," the "amount and
substantiality" of the copyrighted work used, and the "effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. "I Over
("Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted
work .... .") (emphasis added).
87. Judge Leval has observed that in the context of fair use: "Reversals and divided
courts are commonplace." Pierre N. Leval, Commentary: Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103
HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1106-07 (1990). Professor Weinreb similarly has noted that "[t]he field
is littered with the corpses of overturned opinions" and that "[i]t is de rigueur to begin a
scholarly discussion [of fair use] by quoting one of the judicial laments that fair use defies
definition." Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair's Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1137, 1137 (1990).
88. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, J.).
89. See Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1323 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Congress
established these nonexclusive factors as a guide to courts considering fair use."); Maxtone-
Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1260 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that "factors listed in the
statute are not intended to be exclusive"); Financial Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv.,
Inc., 751 F.2d 501, 508 (2d Cir. 1984) ("Rather than a sequence of four rigid tests, the fair
use analysis consists of a 'sensitive balancing of interests.'").
90. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)-(4) (1994). The entirety of § 107 provides as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by
any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship,
or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use
made of a work in any particular case is fair use the factors to be considered shall
include -
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a corn-
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the years, courts9' and commentators 92 have attempted to refine and recast
the analysis of these statutory factors and to devise alternative approaches
to fair use in an effort to bring greater uniformity and predictability to the
application of this enigmatic doctrine. Although these goals are laudable,
fair use is, and likely will remain, a doctrine that courts will apply on a
case-by-case basis, despite the inconsistency and unpredictability that
necessarily results from such an ad hoe approach.
mercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if
such finding is made upon consideration of all the above factors.
Id. § 107.
91. For example, the Supreme Court in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417 (1984), attempted tQ formulate presumptions to expedite the analysis of the
four factors. The Court noted that a finding of commercial purpose as to the first factor
gave rise to a conclusion that the defendant's copying was "presumptively ... unfair,"
which in turn gave rise to a presumption as to the fourth factor that the defendant's use
adversely affected the potential market for the copyrighted work. Id. at 451. More
recently, however, the Court held that a finding of commercial use does not render the use
presumptively unfair: "No such evidentiary presumption is available to address either the
first factor ... or the fourth ... in determining whether a transformative use, such as
parody, is a fair one." Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 594 (1994)
(Souter, J.).
92. For a sampling of the voluminous commentary in this regard, see generally
Michael G. Anderson & Paul F. Brown, The Economics Behind Copyright Fair Use: A
Princioled and Predictable Body of Law, 24 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 143 (1993); Frank P. Darr,
Testing an Economic Theory of Copyright: Historical Materials and Fair Use, 32 B.C. L.
REv. 1027 (1991); Jay Dratler, Jr., Distilling the Witches' Brew of Fair Use in Copyright
Law, 43 U. MIAM L. REV. 233 (1988); William W. Fischer, HI, Reconstructing the Fair
Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REy. 1661 (1988); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use As Market
Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 1600 (1982); Laura G. Lape, Transforming Fair Use: The Productive Use
Factor in Fair Use Doctrine, 58 ALB. L. REV. 677 (1995); Pierre N. Leval, Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose: Justice Souter's Rescue of Fair Use, 13 CAROZO ARTS & EN'r. L.J. 19
(1994) [hereinafter Leval, Rescue of Fair Use]; Pierre N. Leval, Fair Use or Foul?, 36
J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 167 (1989) [hereinafter Leval, Fair Use or Foul?]; Leval, supra
note 87; William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presump-
tions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667 (1993); Richard A. Posner,
When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1992); Leo J. Raskind, A Functional
Interpretation of Fair Use, 31 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 601 (1984); Weinreb, supra note 87, at
1137; and L. Ray Patterson, Understanding Fair Use, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring
1992, at 249.
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II. The Incompatibility of Moral Rights and Fair Use
Although the fair-use doctrine is an explicit statutory limitation on
artists' federal moral rights, moral rights are utterly incompatible with fair
use. Although other commentators have mentioned the problem,' none has
analyzed it thoroughly.' For example, during the congressional debate
over VARA in 1989, Professor Ginsburg of the Columbia Law School
noted that it would be "inappropriate" to subject the integrity and attribution
rights to fair use.9 Lawyer Peter Karlen similarly commented: "I don't see
93. See PATRY, supra note 52, at 1049 ("One potentially fascinating area of conflict
between traditional copyright law and VARA is the provision making Section 106A rights
subject to the fair use defense."); PATRY, supra note 11, at 393-94 (same); Damich, supra
note 1, at 987 ("The application of the fair use doctrine is inappropriate in the case of the
right of integrity as applied to irreplaceable works, and in the case of the right of attribu-
tion."); Peter H. Karlen, Caifornia Art Legislation Goes Federal: AALS Art Law Section
Symposium-Moral Rights and Real Life Artists, 15 HASTINGS CoMM. & ENT. L.. 929, 939
(1993) ("[It is difficult to imagine what a fair use of an art work can be, especially based
on the kinds of 'fair use' arguments we have encountered in litigation."); see also Eric M.
Brooks, Note, "dted" Justice: Site-Specific Art and Moral Rights After U.S. Adherence to
Berne Convention, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1431, 1477 (1989); Robert J. Sherman, Note, The
Viual Artists Rights Act of 1990: American Artists Burned Again, 17 CARDozo L. REv. 373,
412 (1995). In the context of traditional moral rights, Patterson and Lindberg have noted
that moral rights and fair use are antithetical notions: "The moral-rights doctrine is to the
author what the fair-use doctrine is to the user - each being a limitation on the monopoly
of copyright to benefit a class of persons favored by the constitutional copyright clause."
L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF
USER'S RIGHTS 171 (1991).
94. The only extended discussion of the application of fair use to artists' integrity
rights reached the surprising conclusion that fair use should be given "wide berth" in this
regard. See generally Yonover, "Dissing" of Da Vinci, supra note 1; Yonover, Precarious
Balance, supra note 1 (substantially similar later version of "Dissing" ofDa Vinci). For all
of the reasons discussed below, however, fair use should not be given "wide berth" to limit
federal moral rights. See infra Part Il.
95. On the application of fair use to VARA, Professor Ginsburg noted:
The bill would subject the integrity and attribution rights to the § 107 fair use
exemption. I believe this is inappropriate. What is "fair" about mutilating an
original (or one of a limited edition)? What public policy does it advance; what
public benefit does it secure? Fair use generally concerns the productive use of
a prior work in the creation of a new expression. Under the bill as drafted, one
can certainly mutilate a multiple (one of over 200) to make a point (parodistic or
otherwise) about a work; what social need is there to destroy the original?
Similarly, what is "fair" about denying authorship credit, or falsely attributing
an artist's name? In this context, it is worth noting that many Berne countries
whose copyright laws include provisions essentially equivalent to the fair use
exception make that exception subject to acknowledging the authorship of the
copied source.
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33 (1997)
how the [fair-use] factors enumerated at Section 107 particularly relate to
these rights of artists."' Mindful of these comments, Congress acknowl-
edged that "the modification of a single copy or limited edition of a work
of visual art has different implications for the fair use doctrine than does an
act involving a work reproduced in potentially unlimited copies. "I Instead
of exploring these "different implications," however, Congress hastily98
included a fair-use limitation on federal moral rights, relying upon little
more than the following assurance from a subordinate in the Copyright
Office: "Our preliminary assessment has been that there isn't any significant
conflict between the fair use doctrine and the copyright law and the pro-
posed rights of integrity and attribution. "I Congress's haste is apparent
from the ungrammatical nature in which it integrated federal moral rights
Visual Artists' Rights Act of 1989: Hearings on H.R. 2690 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Intellectual Property, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong. 89 (1989) [hereinafter H.R. Hearings on the Visual Artists' Rights Act of 1989]
(statement of Prof. Jane C. Ginsburg) (citations omitted).
96. Moral Rights in Our Copyright Laws: Hearings on S. 1198 and S. 1253 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong. 105-06 (1989) [hereinafter S. Hearings on Moral Rights in Our Copyright Laws]
(statement of Peter H. Karlen). Pointedly, Karlen raised the following questions: "How
can it possibly be a fair use to destroy or mutilate a work of art? How can it be a fair
use to deprive the artist of credit, especially since giving credit is one of the considerations
in determining that there has been a fair use." Id. at 105. He also stated: "I still don't
see how users have any need to use an artwork to deprive the artist of moral rights.
Dealers, collectors, museums, and art administrators have no need to use works of fine art
in a manner which causes destruction or mutilation or deprives the artist of credit." Id. at
106.
97. H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 22 (1990).
98. VARA passed on the very last day of the 101st Congress as part of a larger bill
authorizing eighty-five new federal judgeships. See Sirota, supra note 21, at 463-64.
99. Congressman Cobel asked Register of Copyrights Ralph Oman as "[o]ne final
question" if he would comment on Professor Ginsburg's statement that it would be "inappro-
priate to subject the integrity and attribution right to the 107 fair use exemption." H.R.
Hearings on the Visual Artists' Rights Act of 1989, supra note 95, at 77. Oman apologized
that he had not "read her testimony" and then deferred to one of his deputies, Ms. Schrader.
Id. Schrader testified as follows:
Ms. SCImADER. Our preliminary assessment has been that there isn't any
significant conflict between the fair use doctrine and the copyright law and the
proposed rights of integrity and attribution. However, to the extent that Con-
gress has any doubt - and this bill suggests there may be some doubt - then it
would be a wise move to subject the moral right to the fair use provision just as
the economic rights are subjected to the fair use provision. So in practical terms,
we don't really think it is going to be a problem. But we would support the bill
subjecting the moral right to the fair use provision.
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into the fair-use provision of the Copyright Act.100 But its lack of delibera-
tion is most apparent upon considering both the doctrinal incompatibility of
fair use and federal moral rights and the difficulties associated with trying
to apply the former to limit the latter.10 1 This Part explores the different
implications of applying fair use in the context of federal moral rights and
concludes that these differences illustrate the fundamental incompatibility
of the doctrines.
A. The Nature of the Things Affected by the Fair-Use Doctrine
and by Federal Moral Rights Are Distinctly Different
The Copyright Act and VARA create rights in things."° However, the
nature of the intangible things affected by the Copyright Act (and its fair-
use doctrine) and the nature of the tangible things affected by federal moral
rights are vastly different. For the following reasons, copyright's fair-use
doctrine is out of place in the tangible domain of federal moral rights.
1. Things Affected by Copyright and Its Fair-Use Doctrine
The Copyright Act creates and governs property rights in certain
intangible intellectual things, particularly "original works of authorship.""ta
American copyright law, therefore, is not primarily about governing rights
in the tangible objects1" embodying intellectual works. Section 202 makes
100. The fair-use provision, § 107, presently provides: "Notwithstanding the provisions
of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by repro-
duction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section ... is not
an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (emphasis added). In leaving un-
touched the phrase "that section," Congress failed to conform the existing language of § 107
to the revision that inserted the reference to § 106A. Thus, Congress's utilization of the
singular limiting adjective "that" rather than the plural "those" was a sloppy oversight.
101. Given that Congress does not seem to have thought through any of the implications
of limiting federal moral rights with the fair-use doctrine, the title of this Article perhaps
should be Thinking Through the Compatibility of Fair Use and Moral Rights rather than
Rethinking ....
102. Technically speaking, the provisions of VARA are now part of the Copyright Act,
17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810. For purposes of this Article, however, the term "Copyright Act"
refers to those portions of Title 17, including §§ 102, 106, and 107, that govern traditional
economic exclusive rights; the term "VARA" refers to those portions of Title 17, including
§ 106A, that govern "works of visual art" as defined in § 101.
103. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) ("Copyright protection subsists .. . in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated .. .
104. "Tangible property, whether real or personal, relates to a physical object. Intan-
gible property ... refers to a set of rights defined by the law that are not related to a phys-
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this abundantly clear: "Ownership of a copyright ...is distinct from
ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied. " 1° Thus,
the Copyright Act carefully distinguishes the intangible copyrighted work
("work of authorship") from a tangible "material object" in which that work
is fixed ("artifact"). Thus, even when an artist sells an oil-on-canvas paint-
ing, he retains the exclusive right to the intangible intellectual thing that he
has created (the work of authorship), and he is free to reproduce that work
in an infinite number of copies. In contrast, although the owner of the
artifact may sell the tangible object at will," 6 he may not violate the artist's
rights in the intellectual work embodied therein by, for example, reproduc-
ing the work in copies."
As a body of law governing the ownership of intangible, intellectual
things, copyright is a branch of intellectual property law. One commentator
has described intellectual property law as "a system of rights in things that
are not really there."'18 Justice Story similarly observed in a celebrated
ical object." DONALD A. GREGORY ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1
(1994); see also Weinreb, supra note 87, at 1139 ("[C]opyright is not only intangible, and in
that respect different from most of the ordinary things that one holds as property, but
complex.. . ."). Note, however, that a few provisions of the Copyright Act do regulate
rights in tangible things embodying works of authorship. See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (first-sale
doctrine; record-rental provisions).
105. 17 U.S.C. § 202. Section 202 states:
Ownership of a copyright, or any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is
distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied.
Transfer of ownership of any material object... does not of itself convey any
rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object; nor, in the absence of an
agreement, does transfer of ownership of a copyright or of any exclusive rights
under a copyright convey property rights in any material object.
Id.; see, e.g., Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy
of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 817, 818 (1990) ("Intellec-
tual property rights are rights in ideal objects, which are distinguished from the material
substrata in which they are instantiated.").
106. See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994) (first-sale doctrine) ("Notwithstanding the provisions
of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy ... lawfully made under this title, or any
person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to
sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy . . .
107. See id. § 106(1) (reproduction right).
108. Stephen L. Carter, Owning What Doesn't Exist, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 99,
99 (1990) ("Intellectual property... might best be described as a system of rights in things
that are not really there, which is why I-often describe the proprietary rights that intellectual
property rules vest as owning what doesn't exist."). Professor Hughes has opined that
"atypical forms of property, such as intellectual property, are becoming increasingly important
relative to the old paradigms of property, such as farms, factories, and furnishings." Justin
Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 288 (1988).
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copyright decision that intellectual property law is "what may be called the
metaphysics of the law.""9 Although it is difficult to define precisely what
intellectual property is,"' it is instructive to consider some of the differ-
ences between intellectual property (including copyrightable "works of
authorship") and tangible property.
First, intellectual property, unlike most tangible property, is a "public
good.""' In simplest terms, a "public good" is a thing that is not consumed
by use." 2 Because they are not consumed by use, public goods often can
be used simultaneously by numerous people in diverse locations. For
example, a copyrighted work embodied in an oil painting can be reproduced
in thousands of art-history books and then can be used simultaneously by
thousands of people around the world. In contrast, at any given time a
thing such as a framed painting or a car can be used in only one place.
109. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, J.).
110. See GREGORY ET AL., supra note 104, at 1 ("Intellectual property is an intangible
that is not easily described."). A positivist would define intellectual property as "property
created or recognized by existing legal regimes of copyright, patent, trademark, and trade
secret." Hughes, supra note 108, at 292. Professor Hughes further notes: "A universal defin-
ition of intellectual property might begin by identifying it as nonphysical property which stems
from, is identified as, and whose value is based upon some idea or ideas." Id. at 294. This
definition is problematic in the context of copyright because copyright does not protect ideas -
only expression. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). Therefore, copyright's purpose is not to protect
value attributable to the ideas contained in an otherwise copyrightable work.
111. E.g., Fischer, supra note 92, at 1700 ("Unlike most goods and services, [works of
intellect] can be used and enjoyed by unlimited numbers of persons without being 'used up.'");
Gordon, supra note 92, at 1610-11 (discussing public-good characteristic of intellectual
property and copyrighted works of authorship); Linda I. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and
Copyrights, 1989 DuKE L.J. 1532, 1554 (intellectual property is a "public good"); William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL
STUDIES 325, 326 (1989) ("A distinguishing characteristic of intellectual property is its 'public
good' aspect."); Palmer, supra note 105, at 818 n.3 ("The relevant difference between
[intangible goods constituting intellectual property] and tangible goods is that the former can
be instantiated an indefinite number of times, that is, they are not scarce in a static sense,
while tangible goods are spatially circumscribed and are scarce in both the static and the
dynamic sense of the term.").
112. E.g., BAILEY KUKLIN & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL PRIMER 31 (1994); Carter, supra note 108, at 102
(public goods are "non-excludable, in the sense that once they are brought forth from the
mind, they can generally be taken by a second user at a cost close to zero, and they are subject
to non-rivalrous consumption, in the sense that one user's use of the idea does not reduce the
value of the idea to another who wishes to use it"); Gordon, supra note 92, at 1611 (public
goods are "virtually inexhaustible once produced, in the sense that supplying additional access
to new users would not deplete the supply available to others"); Lacey, supra note 111, at
1554 (public goods are "those whose consumption by individual A does not preclude consump-
tion by B, C, D, and others").
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Hence, if you photocopy my painting, we can both use the underlying work
at the same time in different locations; but if you use my car, I walk. The
copyrighted work is a public good; the car is not.
A second characteristic of intangible intellectual property is that it is
more difficult to protect intellectual property than most tangible things. As
a result, intellectual property is susceptible to use by persons who have paid
nothing to create the work (free riders)., 3 For example, a painting repro-
duced in an art-history book can be copied in seconds by anyone operating
a photocopy machine. Having made his painting available to the public, the
painter will have a difficult time preventing others - free riders - from
making unauthorized copies of the work of authorship.
A third characteristic of copyrighted intellectual property, and for pur-
poses of this Article the most important characteristic, is that rights in intel-
lectual property are potentially limited by the fair-use doctrine. An integral
part of the Copyright Act, fair use limits copyright's protection of intangi-
ble intellectual works of authorship."' The fair-use doctrine, however, has
never been applied to tangible property. As a result, one commentator has
noted that "[t]he single most significant difference between intellectual
property and other forms of property is the fair use 'defense."'"1" To
illustrate, consider a hypothetical school teacher's efforts to educate her art-
appreciation class. The fair-use doctrine would permit her to use freely a
slide of a painting to demonstrate a particular genre of contemporary art." 6
But what if she needed a car to take a few members of the class to a local
art museum to see the painting in person? Would it be "fair use" for her
to use her neighbor's car for free and without permission for this clearly
educational purpose?" 7 Absolutely not. It would be criminal. 1
113. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 92, at 1611 ("[P]ersons who have not paid for
access cannot readily be prevented from using a public good. Because it is difficult or
expensive to prevent 'free riders' from using such goods, public goods usually will be
under-produced if left to the private market."); Lacey, supra note 111, at 1554 (stating that
it is difficult to protect intellectual property from "unauthorized uses - it is much easier to
copy a book than to steal a car"). The free-rider problem exists largely because intellectual
property is a public good.
114. See supra Part ll.B.
115. Lacey, supra note 111, at 1544; see also Hughes, supra note 108, at 295 (observ-
ing that fair use is "limitation[ ] on intellectual property rights").
116. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (allowing use for purposes of "classroom teaching"
that would have little or no impact on market for copyrighted work).
117. This is a slight variation on the following hypothetical by Professor Lacey in her
Duke Law Journal article:
The fair use defense may seem unremarkable and logical when applied to intel-
lectual property, but consider its extension to other types of property. Imagine
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Similarly, consider a parodist seeking to mock the modem architectural
design of a home. In order to show that the home looks like it came from
outer space, the parodist spray-paints fanciful Martians all over the front
facade. Given that the parodist was just using the homeowner's house to
produce a new work of art, should the homeowner's rights in his tangible
property be limited by the fair-use doctrine? Please. Fair use simply does
not limit rights in tangible property. Here, one man's parody is another's
graffiti." 9
As an intellectual property institution, fair use simply does not permit
the "entry or physical interference" with tangible property. 20 In sum, the
fair-use doctrine does not now, and has never in its 150-year history in the
United States, affected property rights in tangible property.1
2 1
a teacher appropriating someone's van to take his children on a field trip (clearly
an educational purpose), a collector removing just one gem from the crown
jewels (a de minimis amount taken), or a person inhabiting without rent one of
Donald Trump's thousands of New York apartments (almost no economic effect
on the market). These examples may seem frivolous or impractical, but they are
completely consistent with the underlying assumptions behind the concept of "fair
use." It is only because we are so conditioned to the traditional rules of private
property ownership that we cannot seriously imagine a "fair use" of cars or
housing.
Lacey, supra note 111, at 1545-46.
118. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.9 (1962) (Unauthorized Use of Automobiles and
Other Vehicles) ("A person commits a misdemeanor if he operates another's automobile...
without consent of the owner. It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this Section
that the actor reasonably believed that the owner would have consented to the operation had
he known of it."). Note that fair use is not an affirmative defense to this crime. Id.
119. For this reason, parody that violates artists' integrity rights in tangible artifacts
arguably is nothing more than vandalism by another name.
120. See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges
of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1367-68
(1989) (discussing concerns of intellectual property law in general). That fair use permits
certain unauthorized uses of intangible copyrighted works is partly attributable to the public
nature of intellectual property. That is, permitting one person to use fairly a copyrighted
work does not deprive others, particularly the copyright owner, from simultaneously using
the work for other purposes. See Lacey, supra note 111, at 1555 ("The 'public good'
characteristics of intellectual property have been used to justify the fair use defense.");
Posner, supra note 92, at 73 ("Intellectual property is a public good. A pencil is not. If
you take my pencil I cannot use it, but if you take my intellectual property I can still use
it - but my incentive to create it will be diminished if I cannot make you pay for it."). For
a discussion of other justifications for the fair-use defense, see infra Part III.C.1. In
contrast, because of the nonpublic nature of most tangible goods, any purportedly fair use
by another would in fact deprive the copyright owner of his work.
121. Lacey, supra note 111, at 1536 (noting that any attempt to apply such a limitation
"to other forms of property would strike most people as dangerous and unnatural"). Like-
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2. Things Affected by Federal Moral Rights
Unlike the Copyright Act, VARA creates rights in tangible art objects
(artifacts) - not in intangible, intellectual things. That Congress granted
artists limited moral rights in a limited variety of tangible artifacts stands in
marked contrast to the continental moral-rights tradition from which VARA
descended. European moral rights, including those recognized and protected
by Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, are expansive personality-based
rights that protect a wide range of artistic creations. 122 For example, cre-
ators of musical works, motion pictures, literary works, and works of visual
art, among other works, have in Europe protectable attribution and integrity
rights relating to such works.'2 Moral rights in these works are implicated
not only when another misattributes or harms the tangible artifact in which
the artist originally fixed the work, but also when another misattributes or
harms a reproduction of the work. 1" As a result, traditional moral rights
protect the integrity of not only tangible art objects embodying works of
authorship, but also the intangible work of authorship itself.11
wise, Judge Posner has observed that artists are not "allowed to steal paper and pencils"
with the blessing of the fair-use doctrine in order to create parodies. See Posner, supra note
92, at 73. The Supreme Court in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984), noted that the fair-use doctrine would not allow someone to "use" tangible jewelry
under the auspices of fair use:
The use to which stolen jewelry is put is quite irrelevant in determining whether
depriving its true owner of his present possessory interest in it is venial; because
of the nature of the item and the true owner's interests in physical possessiop of it,
the law finds the taking objectionable even if the thief does not use the item at all.
Id. at 450 n.33.
122. See, e.g., 2 NMMER&NIMMER, supra note 67, § 8D.02[A], at 8D-11; Damich,
supra note 1, at 953 (VARA rights do "not measure up to the concept of moral rights em-
bodied in article 6bis"); Sirota, supra note 21, at 467 (VARA does "not provide equivalent
protection to article 6bis of the Berne Convention"); Note, Visual Artists'Rights in a Digital
Age, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1977, 1986 (1994) ("Explicit and implicit limitations on the VARA
integrity right render it unequal to its civil law origins . . ").
123. 2 NIMMER&NIMNMR, supra note 67, § 8D.02[A], at 8D-11 ("Under Continental
notions of moral rights, the author's personality may be said to pervade works of authorship
across categories, from the literary to the graphical to the musical.").
124. E.g., PATRY, supra note 52, at 1025-33 (VARA, unlike the Berne Convention,
does not protect reproductions); WIPO, supra note 45, at 42 ("Generally speaking, a person
permitted to make use of a work (for example by reproducing or publicly performing it) may
not change it either by deletion or by making additions.") (emphasis added); id. at 41
(noting that moral rights are "exercisable even against those permitted by the Convention
to reproduce the work"); Damich, supra note 21, at 389, 404 (subright of Berne's "right of
respect" (right of integrity) prohibiting "unfaithful reproduction" is "the subright to object
to poor-quality reproductions or derivative works involving copies that pervert the work").
125. See Jaszi, supra note 63, at 478 n.87 ("It is interesting to note that in Continental
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Federal moral rights are considerably different. Unlike traditional
moral rights, federal attribution and integrity rights do not and were not
intended to protect the intangible work of authorship embodied in the
VARA-protected artifact." On the contrary, these rights relate only to the
original artifact in which the artist fixed the work.1" For example, because
an artist who creates an original oil-on-canvas artifact has created a work of
visual art," he has the right to prevent others from distorting, mutilating,
or modifying it in a manner "prejudicial to his or her honor or reputa-
tion."29 But he only has the right to prevent others from modifying that
artifact; VARA does not prevent others from making noninfringing copies '
of the underlying work of authorship and then distorting, mutilating, or
law the distinction between the physical object in which a 'work' is embodied and the
'work' itself, so crucial to Anglo-American jurisprudence, is sometimes blurred.").
126. In enacting VARA, "Congress made clear its antipathy to the expansion of copy-
right law to embrace general moral rights." 2 NIMMER&NIMMER, supra note 67, § 8D.06,
at 813-63; see also Note, supra note 122, at 1986 ("Explicit and implicit limitations on the
VARA integrity right render it unequal to its civil law origins .. ").
127. E.g.," 1 BOORsTYN, supra note 44, § 5.0713][a]-[b], at 5-24 to 5-29 (VARA integ-
rity and attribution rights do not apply to reproduced copies of original work); 2 NMmER
& NIMMER, supra note 67, § 8D.02[D][5], at 8D-30 (noting that "distinction between art
and artifact... permeates (and effectively vitiates)" VARA). Nimmer and Nimmer state:
Another distinction bears noting. As previously explained, the copyright catego-
ries of § 102(a) pertain to conceptual creations. By contrast, the... definition
of "works of visual art" refers solely to physical items. To illustrate, a "pictorial
work" could be portrayed on canvas, in a magazine, on a billboard, or on a
computer screen; but a "work of visual art" can consist only of the artist's
original "painting" and limited edition supervised copies, all other representations
of the same image being definitionally ineligible.
M. § 8D.06[A][2], at 8D-69 to 8D-70; see also PATRY, supra note 52, at 1032-33 (noting
that "VARA's principal goal is to preserve the physical integrity of the physical embodiment
of visual art'); Damich, supra note 21, at 402 (noting that "perhaps its biggest drawback
is that VARA does not provide for the subright against unfaithful reproduction'); id. at 403
(Article 6bs "applies to all literary and artistic works. VARA applies only to a very narrow
definition of visual art.'). As a result, VARA does not prevent the misattribution or the
infliction of harm to a copy: "VARA does not provide for the subright against unfaithful
reproduction." Id. at 401.
In keeping with VARA, Congress passed the National Film Preservation Act of 1992,
which preserves only celluloid film and does not accord true moral rights protection to
films. 2 NIMMER & NmimER,.supra note 67, § 8D.02[D][4], at 8D-27 to 8D-28; see 2
U.S.C. § 179(a)-(k) (1994) (National Film Preservation Act).
128. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining "work of visual art" to include "a paint-
ing ... existing in a single copy").
129. Id. § 106A(a)(3)(A) (integrity right).
130. To be noninfringing, the copies either (1) must be substantially different from the
copyrighted work, (2) must be authorized by the copyright owner, or (3) must otherwise be
permitted by a limitation on § 106 exclusive rights, such as the fair-use defense.
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otherwise modifying any of the new copies. Considering that VARA's
principal effect is to create rights in tangible artifacts,"' and considering
that the fair-use doctrine has never limited rights in tangible property, fair
use should not limit artists' federal moral rights in tangible artifacts.
B. The Rights Trumped When Fair Use Limits
Federal Moral Rights Are Distinct from Those Trumped When
Fair Use Limits Copyright Exclusive Rights
Just as the nature of the things affected by the Copyright Act and
VARA differs, so too does the nature of the rights created by each. The
Copyright Act creates property rights to protect works of authorship.
VARA, however, creates difficult to define, but property-like, rights in
artifacts distinctively bound up with the artist's person. Regardless whether
federal moral rights are characterized as personality-based rights or as
property rights in "personal property," their intimate affiliation with the
artist suggests that they deserve greater respect than ordinary property
rights, including those created by copyright. Because federal moral rights
arguably deserve greater respect than the copyright rights trumped by fair
use, the fair-use doctrine should not impinge on moral rights to the same
extent that it impinges upon copyright's exclusive rights.
1. Federal Moral Rights as Personality-Based Rights
Continental moral rights are a component of the artist's right of
personality. For this reason, they are distinct from any property rights that
the artist may have in a work of authorship or in an artifact embodying
such a work.3 As rights of personality, true moral rights are not a part
131. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A) (right of attribution); id. § 106A(3) (right of
integrity). Note, however, that VARA also gives the artist the right "to prevent the use of
his or her name as the author of any work of visual art which he or she did not create."
Id. § 106A(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). This right is personal to the author and does not
relate to a tangible artifact created by him.
132. See Long & D'Amato, supra note 19, at 8 (true moral rights are "premised on
the value added to the work by the unique personality of the human creator" and "differ
from the rights granted under a nation's copyright laws"); see also LEAFFER, supra note 46,
§ 8.27, at 275-76 ("[Ihe moral right of the author... treats the author's work not just as
an economic interest, but as an inalienable, natural right and an extension of the artist's
personality."); PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 93, at 165-66 ("Moral rights are
personal in nature, whereas economic rights are essentially proprietary."); Damich, supra
note 1, at 955 ("Moral rights derive from the fact that a work is an expression of the artist's
personality."); Sirota, supra note 21, at 464-65 (moral rights under Berne Convention are
rights "of personality, separate from economic and property rights").
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of the artist's patrimony, which includes only those "rights and charges
appreciable in money."'33 Hence, to violate a European artist's moral right
of attribution or integrity is "to mistreat the artist, to invade his area of
privacy, to impair his personality" more than it is to hurt his pocketbook."
Unlike continental moral rights, however, federal integrity and attribu-
tion rights are difficult to characterize." Several features of those rights
suggest that they are similar to their personality-based European counter-
parts. First, VARA traces its roots to the European moral-rights tradi-
tion.1 36 Indeed, in enacting VARA, Congress clearly was attempting to
create attribution and integrity rights similar to those developed in continen-
tal Europe and codified in the Berne Convention. 137 Second, federal moral
rights can be enforced only by the artist, 38 cannot be transferred by the
133. 1 PLANIOL & RiPERT, supra note 2, pt. 2, at 266-67. Nonpatrimonial rights in
France include "the right of man to his own body and name; or the intellectual right of an
author to a work of art." 2 AUBRY & RAu DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 162.4 (Paul Esmein
ed., 7th ed. 1961), translated in 2 LA. STATE LAW INST., CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 5 (Jaro
Mayda trans., 1966). Traditionally, nonpatrimonial (or extrapatrimonial) rights cannot be
alienated by the holder. Id. § 162, at 6.
134. 1 JOHN MERRYMAN & A. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 145 (2d
ed. 1987).
135. See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 52, at 1021 (noting both personal and economic
attributes of §§ 106 and 106A rights); Sirota, supra note 21, at 468 ("VARA is a difficult
law to categorize."). Some commentators have described VARA rights as "moral rights"
or have stated that VARA rights are personality-based rights like true continental moral
rights. See, e.g., 1 BOORSTYN, supra note 44, § 5.07, at 5-20 to 5-21 (VARA rights are
"personal to the author and exist independently of his or her economic rights in the copy-
right."). Nevertheless, VARA cannot be so easily classified.
136. See, e.g., 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 67, § 8D.06[A][2], at 8D-69 ("In
recognition of their link more to the author's personality than pocketbook, moral rights stand
in contrast to economic rights. Accordingly, the newly created artists' rights are independ-
ent of copyright ownership rights."); Jaszi, supra note 63, at 500 n.179 ("Adherence to the
Berne Convention had the effect of exposing the United States to the 'culture' of the
Convention, which is rooted in the 'authors' rights' tradition of Continental European law,
and thus in the Romantic vision of 'authorship."').
137. E.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 5 (1990) (VARA rights are "analogous to those
protected by Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, which are commonly known as 'moral
rights'").
138. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b) (1994) ("Only the author of a work of visual art has the
rights conferred by subsection (a) in that work, whether or not the author is the copyright
owner."). That only the author may sue to redress VARA violations (and not his successors
and assignees) suggests that VARA seeks to address personality considerations rather than
economic ones. Professor Hughes notes:
A creator concerned only with economic return might allow radical brutal
changes in his work if this produced the most profit. Personality considerations,
by contrast, cause owners to prohibit change, deletions, or misattributions during
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33 (1997)
artist during his life, and cannot be distributed to his heirs or legatees upon
his death."' Third, federal moral rights, like the rights set forth in Article
6bis, are intended to protect an artist's "honor and reputation"" ° - some-
thing harkening back to personality. 4
If federal moral rights, like continental moral rights, are components
of the artist's right of personality, then mere intellectual property rights,
such as those conferred upon certain users by the fair-use doctrine, should
yield in the case of conflict.4 No European jurisdiction that recognizes
personality-based moral rights limits those rights through a doctrine analo-
gous 43 to fair use.' 44 Moreover, although not explicitly addressing a con-
any reproduction. Indeed, a creator concerned purely with personality expression
might allow free reproduction of his work as long as these restrictions were
honored.
Hughes, supra note 108, at 349 n.244.
139. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) ("The rights conferred by subsection (a)
[attribution and integrity rights] may not be transferred. .. ."); id. § 106A(d) (with regard
to works of visual art created after June 1, 1991, the attribution and integrity rights "shall
endure for a term consisting of the life of the author"); see also PATTERSON & LINDBERG,
supra note 93, at 173 ("Moral rights are personal rights, limited to the creator and thus not
assignable; the rights of copyright protected interests, are not limited to the author, and are
assignable.").
140. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2) (author can prevent use of his name as author of any
modified work "which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation"); i.
§ 106A(a)(3)(A) (author can prevent any "distortion, mutilation, or other modification...
which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation"); H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at
5 (1990) (VARA protects "the reputations of certain visual artists .... "); see also PATRY,
supra note 52, at 1032 n.62 (noting that VARA is "concerned with the artist" in protecting
his reputation); PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 93, at 170 ("A person's name and
reputation are just as much the subject of ownership as his or her house or automobile or
shares of stock in a corporation. The difference is that the latter are deemed to entail
proprietary rights, while the former are labeled personal rights.").
141. Also indicative of the personal nature of federal moral rights is a component of
VARA's attribution right that does not relate to any particular work of art, but rather solely
to the artist. Particularly, the artist has the right "to prevent the use of his or her name as
the author of any work of visual art which he or she did not create." See 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Given that this component of the attribution right does
not relate to any tangible or intangible thing (other than the artist himself), it appears to
relate to the artist's personality.
142. See Lacey, supra note 111, at 1548-49 ("In a direct conflict, the artist's moral
rights limit the purchaser's property rights.").
143. The American fair-use doctrine has been characterized as "sui generis." See
PATRY, supra note 11, at 589. Thus, there is no identical doctrine in Europe. See id. at
590.
144. E.g., Yonover, "Dissing" ofDa Vimci, supra note 1, at 1002-03 (noting that "most
countries that provide moral rights protection do not recognize a fair use defense");
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flict between moral rights and fair use, the Supreme Court in Harper &
Row Publishers v. Nation Enterprises45 deliberated whether the fair-use
doctrine sanctioned the defendant's publication of portions of the then-
unpublished autobiography of President Gerald Ford. Determining that the
user's conduct did not constitute fair use, the Court in essence held that fair
use must yield to the author's interest in choosing when and in what form
to publish his work. This interest correlates to the author's personality-
based moral right of divulgation, a right that is well recognized in Europe
and that underlies the publication right of Copyright Act Section 106(3).1"
Thus, in at least one instance, the Court has subordinated fair use to an
author's personal interests.147
2. Federal Moral Rights as "Personal Property" Rights
The notion that federal moral rights, like traditional moral rights, are
components of the author's right of personality is sentimentally appeal-
Yonover, Precarious Balance, supra note 1, at 121 (same); Note, supra note 122, at 1991
("[S]ubjecting the VARA rights to the fair use provision of the Copyright Act places
American visual artists at a distinct disadvantage as compared with artists in countries that
do not recognize a fair use defense to violations of moral rights."). But see Gorman, supra
note 21, at 427 (stating that "[a] number of national laws incorporate the doctrine of fair use
as a defense against moral rights claims (as with copyright claims), or permit certain
educational uses or parodies," without citing a single source or example). It is interesting
to note that when the Beme Convention's counterpart to the fair-use doctrine is applied to
permit the otherwise unauthorized use of an intangible work of authorship, the user must
respect the original author's right to attribution. See PA'RY, supra note 11, at 592-93.
That is, the Berne Convention explicitly permits others to "make quotations" from works
available to the public, provided that the quoting is "compatible with fair practice." Id.
However, that right is qualified in Article 10(3) "by the requirement that the user 'mention
... the source, and.., the name of the author if it appears thereon.'" Id. at 593-94.
"This condition is designed to protect the author's right of attribution, granted in Article
6bis(1)." Id. at 594.
145. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
146. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 67, § 8D.02[C], at 8D-13 to 8D-14 ("Mhe
author's right to control publication of his work can be seen as a species of the droit de
divulgation.").
147. See PATRY, supra note 52, at 1021 n.11 ("IThe Supreme Court [in The Nation
case] has recognized that § 106 rights may implicate personal interests" of author); Fischer,
supra note 92, at 1690-92 (characterizing The Nation case as fair-use decision that took into
account the artist's "privacy rights" and "rights of artistic integrity"). Of course, there are
other explanations for the Court's decision in The Nation case. See generally, e.g., Gary
L. Francione, Facing the Nation: The Infringement and Fair Use of Factual Works, 134 U.
PA. L. REv. 519 (1986); John M. Kernochan, Protection of Unpublished Works in the
United States Before and After the "Nation" Case, 33 J. CoPYRIGHT Soc'Y 322 (1986);
William F. Patry, Fair Use After "Sony" and "Harper & Row," 8 CoMM. & L. 21 (1986).
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ing.141 However, several other features of federal moral rights function
more like property rights than like personality rights. Federal moral rights,
like property rights, relate to a thing (an artifact). Federal moral rights,
like property rights, may be enforced against the world, that is, against
anyone that violates the artist's integrity or attribution rights. Federal
moral rights, like property rights, follow the thing to which they are
attached149 and can be waived.15 And perhaps most importantly, although
attribution and integrity moral rights trace their roots to Europe, VARA's
legal footing in the United States is the property-based institution of copy-
right. To be sure, in enacting VARA Congress noted that federal moral
rights are "consistent with the purpose behind the copyright laws and the
Constitutional provision they implement.""'5 It is well established that the
Constitution, and the copyright laws enacted pursuant to its Patent and
Copyright Clause, create copyright law rights through positive grant52 to
provide economic incentives for artistic creation - not to enforce for their
148. Hughes, supra note 108, at 366 ("[R]ights to labor and rights to individual expres-
sion do have much more of a siren's call than property rights.").
149. See Ciolino, supra note 21, at 964-67 (noting similarities between property rights
and traditional moral rights); Hughes, supra note 108, at 345-46 (noting that "[s]pecific
covenants and restrictions on property" function like continuing personality rights in
property because all permit person to retain "the specific stick(s) in the bundle of property
rights which will 'contain' his continuing personality stake"); id. at 351 (noting that
traditional moral rights prevent alienation of certain rights in intellectual property and
therefore "prevent the complete alienation of the property"); Lacey, supra note 111, at
1548-49 (in context of true moral rights, noting that "the artist never really gives up her
interest in the work of art to the subsequent property holder"); id. at 1583 n.222 (same).
150. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1) (1994). VARA attribution and integrity rights
may be waived if the author expressly agrees to such waiver in a written instru-
ment signed by the author. Such instrument shall specifically identify the work,
and uses of that work, to which the waiver applies, and the waiver shall apply
only to the work and uses so identified.
Id.; see also PATRY, supra note 52, at 1021 n.ll (VARA rights are not "purely personal"
as evidenced by fact that "an artist may waive his or her § 106A rights in exchange for
money"). However, true personality-based moral rights are waivable in most European
jurisdictions. See Brooks, supra note 93, at 1479 ("Because it is conceptually abhorrent to
forfeit 'ownership' of a personality right, assignment or transfer of paternity and integrity
interests are forbidden; however, an artist may waive her right to enforce those rights as
against a specified purchaser or commissioner."); Strauss, supra note 21, at 515. Nor does
the Berne Convention prohibit waiver of 6bis rights. See WIPO, supra note 45, at 41-44.
151. H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 5 (1990).
152. PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 93, at 110 (stating that in 1976 Copyright
Act, Congress "clearly selected a single theory on which to build the new law: the statutory-
grant theory"); Leval, supra note 87, at 1108 (copyright exclusive rights "exist only by
virtue of statutory enactment").
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own sake natural-law rights in artists' creations." Considering that Con-
gress enacted VARA pursuant to the limited power granted to it by the
Patent and Copyright Clause, and considering that other features of VARA
do not appear to function as personality rights, federal moral rights are
better characterized as property rights."
Even so, all property rights are not equal. Some warrant greater
protection than others. Professor Margaret Jane Radin has persuasively
argued that certain property is "bound up with a person" to such a degree
that its loss would cause the owner "pain that cannot be relieved by the
object's replacement."155 Radin uses the following example to illustrate the
distinct nature of such property: "[1]f a wedding ring is stolen from a
jeweler, insurance proceeds can reimburse the jeweler, but if a wedding
ring is stolen from a loving wearer, the price of a replacement will not
restore the status quo - perhaps no amount of money can do so."'56 To
distinguish property "bound up with a person" from property held instru-
mentally (that is, property "replaceable with goods of equal market value"),
Radin uses the terms "fungible property" and "personal property."'"
Arguing that personal property "gives rise to a stronger moral claim than
[fungible] property,""' she maintains that personal property rights "should
153. E.g., Leval, supra note 87, at 1108 (copyright exclusive rights are not "absolute
or moral right[s], inherent in natural law").
154. Some commentators have questioned whether VARA's exceedingly limited recog-
nition of authors' rights jeopardizes the United States' accession to the Berne Convention,
Article 6bis of which recognizes significantly more expansive moral rights. See PATRY,
supra note 52, at 1025 n.25; Damich, supra note 21, at 406-07.
155. MARGARFr J. RADiN, RETINKING PROPERTY 37 (1993) (reprinting Margaret J.
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982)). Radin's contention that
persons can become bound up with external objects traces its roots to Hegel, who "argued
in his Philosophy of Right that placing the will into an object takes the person from abstract
to actual," and to Kant, who "argued in his Rechtslehre that property was necessary to give
full scope to the free will of persons." Id. at 7. Interestingly, the continental moral-rights
tradition likewise is philosophically rooted in the works of Hegel and Kant. See Netanel,
Alienability Restrictions, supra note 21, at 20-21. For a recent critique of Radin's property-
law theories, see generally Neil Duxbury, Law, Markets and Valuation, 61 BROOK. L. REv.
657 (1995).
156. RADiN, supra note 155, at 37. Radin uses the home as another example of prop-
erty bound up with a person: "Our reverence for the sanctity of the home is rooted in the
understanding that the home is inextricably part of the individual, the family, and the fabric
of society." Id. at 71.
157. Id. at 37.
158. Id. at 48. But see Duxbury, supra note 155, at 667 (characterizing as "question-
able" Radin's contention that personal property has stronger moral claim to protection than
fungible property).
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be protected to some extent against invasion by government and against
cancellation by conflicting fungible property claims of other people." ' 9
Conversely, fungible property rights generally "should yield to some extent
in the face of conflicting, recognized personhood interests." 11 Rather than
advocating a rigid dichotomy between personal and fungible property,
Radin proposes that "it makes more sense to think of a continuum that
ranges from a thing indispensable to someone's being to a thing wholly
interchangeable with money. Many relationships between persons and
things will fall somewhere in the middle of this continuum."16' Where on
this continuum a certain thing falls can change over time as the holder's
relationship with the object changes and as it is transferred from person to
person. 162
Evaluating VARA's property-like attribution and integrity moral rights
in light of Radin's continuum further illustrates why those rights, even if
not considered to be personality-based rights, should prevail over conflict-
ing fair-use claims. Federal moral rights are more "bound up" with the
person of the artist, and hence closer to the "personal" end of the contin-
uum than copyright's exclusive economic rights typically are. After all,
there exists a "uniquely strong bond"'' " between an artist and his creations;
"[tihe man who brings out of nothingness some child of his thought has
rights therein which cannot belong to any other sort of property. 1'6
159. RADiN, supra note 155, at 71.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 53.
162. Id. at 16-17, 54. Radin notes that the personhood dichotomy
focuses on the person with whom [the object] ends up - on an internal quality
in the holder or a subjective relationship between the holder and the thing. The
same claim can change from fungible to personal depending on who holds it.
The wedding ring is fungible to the artisan who made it and now holds it for
exchange even though it is property resting on the artisan's own labor. Con-
versely, the same item can change from fungible to personal over time without
changing hands.
Id. at 54. Radin notes that the connection of a wedding ring to its owner could "become
personal over time (its emotional significance could grow); or it could become abruptly
depersonal, perhaps even reverting to fungible, if the relationship with which it was
associated suddenly became a source of resentment and betrayal." Id. at 16.
163. Patterson and Lindberg have noted the possibility of viewing the moral right as "a
personal-proprietary right." PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 93, at 175.
164. Lacey, supra note 111, at 1593.
165. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright (1), 45 CoLUM. L.
REV. 503, 506-07 (1945) (quoting Thorvald Solberg, Copyright Reform, 14 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 343, 358 (1939)); Sirota, supra note 21, at 469 ("A piece of fine art may be a piece
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Furthermore, federal moral rights descended from personality-based moral
rights can vest only in the author," cannot be transferred to others, can be
exercised only by the author himself, and protect, among other things, the
author's personal honor and reputation.167 For these reasons, federal moral
rights should be considered closer to the personal end of Radin's continuum
than to the fungible end.
In marked contrast to federal moral rights, the Copyright Act's exclu-
sive rights do not stem from the artist-centered moral-rights tradition."
And, unlike federal moral rights, copyright exclusive rights can vest ini-
tially in a person or entity other than the artist, 69 can be freely transferred
in whole or in part to others,"7 can be exercised by any transferee,' and
protect more an economic market for the artist's creations than the artist
himself." Although some aspects of the Copyright Act reflect Congress's
concern for protecting artists' personal interests in artistic creations,"
Copyright Act rights are decidedly closer to the fungible end of Radin's
continuum than are VARA rights.
The fair-use doctrine vests in users of preexisting works the right to
trump relatively fungible copyright exclusive rights. For example, in Sony
of personal property, but more than any other kind of property, that art is inextricably
bound up with the personality and reputation of its author.").
166. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b) (1994) ("Only the author of a work of visual art has
the [attribution and integrity] rights . . . whether or not the author is the copyright
owner.").
167. See supra Part EII.B.1.
168. See infra Part lI.C.1.
169. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b). Section 201(b) states:
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the
work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless
the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by
them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.
Id.
170. Id. § 201(d)(1) ("The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in
part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will
or pass as personal property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.").
171. Id. § 501(b) ("The legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under a copy-
right is entitled . . . to institute an action for any infringement of that particular right
committed while he or she is the owner of it.").
172. See infra Part In.C.1.
173. For example, the distribution right protects a right similar to the moral right of
divulgation, see 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1994), and the termination-of-transfers provision gives
an artist a continuing interest in his work of authorship even after transferring the copyright
to another, see id. § 203.
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Corp. v. Universal City Studios," the Supreme Court held that home VCR
owners using Betamax machines to time-shift television programs could rely
upon fair use to trump certain rights of the copyright owners of publicly
broadcast television programs. Given that the studios holding the copy-
rights were interested only in commercially exploiting the works, the
studios were not "bound up" with the copyrighted works at issue. As a
result, their property rights in the works were fungible and, hence, readily
trumpable.
Although applying fair use to trump relatively fungible copyright
exclusive rights is well accepted, applying it to trump more personal federal
moral rights should not be. Consider the painter of an oil-on-canvas work:
As the painting's creator, the artist may be "bound up" with it to such a
degree that she does not want the artifact misattributed or altered without
her permission.I"5 As a visual artist "bound up" with her work of visual
art, she has the continuing right to protect her interest in the artifact even
after she has transferred it to another. This right is more personal than
typical economic rights. To apply fair use, a doctrine born as a restriction
on more fungible economic rights, in an effort to trump decidedly more
personal federal moral rights would be troubling.
C. The Moral Justifications for the Fair-Use Doctrine and for
Federal Moral Rights Are Irreconcilable
Laws exist for reasons.176 The reasons for the Copyright Act and
VARA - their respective justifications - are largely dissimilar. While the
Copyright Act and its fair-use doctrine exist primarily to further the conse-
quentialist goal of promoting the creation of new works of authorship,
VARA exists primarily to further nonconsequentialist notions of artistic
respect and artifact preservation. For the following reasons, the utilitarian
fair-use doctrine should not limit federal moral rights intended to further
nonutilitarian goals.
174. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
175. If not, she may simply waive her attribution and integrity rights in the artifact, see
17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1), transfer her copyright, see id. §§ 201(d), 204-05, and then sell to
the highest bidder.
176. These reasons often go unconsidered: "Law's underpinnings, like many founda-
tions or backgrounds, can be easily overlooked because we usually stand upon them or
because we are straining to see something more specific on the horizon." KUKLIN &
STEMPEL, supra note 112, at 2.
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Ethical theories justifying the existence of property laws,"TI including
laws creating property rights in intangible works of authorship, typically
fall into one of two general categories: consequentialist or nonconsequen-
tialist.'78 On the one hand, consequentialist theories, particularly utilitarian
theories, maintain that the rightness or wrongness of a legal rule turns on
the goodness or badness of its consequences. " Hence, utilitarians justify
property rights "on the basis of the good consequences of their legal recog-
nition, as distinct from their moral rightness. 1" On the other hand, non-
consequentialist theories - deontological theories - maintain that the
rightness or wrongness of a legal rule turns solely on its moral propriety,
regardless of its "consequences for human weal or woe.""8 ' Deontologists
177. To consider the foundation of legal principles is to engage in moral philosophy, a
"philosophical inquiry about norms or values, about ideas of right and wrong, good and bad,
what should and what should not be done." D.D. RAPHAEL, MORAL PHILosoPHY 8 (1994).
178. E.g., Lacey, supra note 111, at 1564-67; Dale A. Nance, Owning Ideas, 13
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 757, 763 (1990); see also Carter, supra note 108, at 100 (stating
that most people "who write on intellectual property today justify the rules either on the
moral ground that each of us possesses a natural right to control what we create or on the
utilitarian ground that absent regulation, there will be no optimal supply of intellectual
creations"); Barbara Friedman, Note, From Deontology to Dialogue: The Cultural Conse-
quences of Copyright, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 157 (1994). For discussions on the
justifications for property rights in general, see LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS:
PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS (1977); STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY (1990);
JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988); Morris R. Cohen, Property
and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927); and Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L.
REv. 1165 (1967).
179. J.J.C. Smart, Utilitarianism, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 206, 206 (Paul
Edwards ed., 1967).
180. Nance, supra note 178, at 763. Nance adds that utilitarian theories, including eco-
nomic theories,
generally measure the good in terms of the satisfaction of human preferences,
without imposing a judgment about whether those preferences are, in some
objective sense, appropriate or correct. This measurement is done, by and large,
by allowing aggregate preferences to be registered by the operation of the
market, in this context by the demand that is revealed for the ideas in question.
Id.; see also Hughes, supra note 108, at 764-65.
181. Robert G. Olson, Deontological Ethics, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
supra note 179, at 343, 343. Olson states: "The first of the great philosophers emphatically
to enunciate the deontological principle was Immanuel Kant .... Kant went so far as to
argue that it is wrong to tell a lie even to save another man's life. Moral rules, he claimed,
are universally valid and admit of no exceptions." Id.; see also Palmer, supra note 105, at
820 (commenting that "personality-based rights theory forms the foundation of German and
French copyright law" and harkens "back to Kant's discussions of the nature of authorship
and publication and to Hegel's theory of cultural evolution").
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typically justify property rights on one of two grounds:" (1) that a creator
of a thing deserves to own the fruits of his labor (labor theory)," or
(2) that a creator of a thing deserves to own the thing because it is an
extension of his personality (personality theory).l"I Unlike utilitarian
theories, these two deontological justifications focus on the relationship
between the creator and property, and on assuring that creators "get and
keep what is due them.""8
1. Justifications for Copyright and Its Fair-Use Doctrine
The ethical justifications for American copyright law are schizophrenic:
sometimes utilitarian, sometimes deontological. Illustrative of the conflux
of these inconsistent notions is the Supreme Court's opinion in Mazer v.
Stein. 6 In Mazer, the Court articulated both a utilitarian basis for copy-
right ("to advance public welfare") as well as a deontological one (to
provide "deserve[d] rewards" for "[s]acrificial days devoted to... creative
activities")."f While some copyright law institutions can be explained only
182. Hughes, supra note 108, at 290 ("Properly elaborated, the labor and personality
theories together exhaust the set of morally acceptable justifications of intellectual prop-
erty."); Nance, supra note 178, at 763-64. These two deontological theories reflect "the
'moral rights' tradition." Id.
183. This is the Lockean labor theory of property. Nance, supra note 178, at 764. For
more on this justification for property, see Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-
Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102
YALE L.J. 1533 (1993).
184. This is the personality theory of property that "is most commonly attributed to the
German philosopher Hegel and is better established in continental law." Nance, supra note
178, at 764; see also Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Lav, 94 MICH.
L. REV. 1197, 1240-42 (1996) ("The notion that intellectual property rights are essential to
protect personal identity is often traced to Hegel. For Hegel, property is the means by
which personality is objectified.").
185. Michelman, supra note 178, at 1203-05. Michelman states:
A [nonconsequentialist] "desert" theory ... is one which justifies property by
appeal to an ethical postulate about individual merit, asserting that property is
desirable because under its regime individuals are able to get and keep what is
due them. Such a theory makes no assertion that property is desirable because
it leads to consequences which can be regarded as good for society "as a whole."
Id.
186. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
187. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). The Court goes on to state:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort
by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors in "Science and the useful Arts" [the Utilitarian justifica-
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in deontological terms, 8 most reflect the predominance of utilitarian
thinking. 189 Indeed, the Supreme Court has often observed that copyright
law exists to pursue utilitarian goals rather than to recognize authors'
natural rights."9 Likewise, Congress recently noted that "[t]he primary
dion]. Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards com-
mensurate with the services rendered [the Deontological justification].
Id. Several commentators have discussed the coexistence of deontological and utilitarian
justifications for copyright. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 49, at 998-1002 (observing that
American copyright law prior to 1790 reflected influence of Lockean desert theory, but later
turned to utilitarian theories); Sterk, supra note 184, at 1199 (stating that copyright rhetoric
in America has championed "needs of the deserving author, emphasizing the need to induce
creative activity, or both").
188. For example, copyright's termination-of-transfer provision, see 17 U.S.C. § 203
(1994) (permitting author and certain of his relations to terminate copyright transfer 35-40
years after transfer), reflects an effort to reward "the deserving author and his family."
Sterk, supra note 184, at 1228-29. This "provision is difficult to justify as an incentive to
creative efforts." Id. at 1217-20. See generally Alfred C. Yen, When Authors Won't Sell:
Parody, Fair Use, and Efficiency in Copyright Law, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 79, 108 (1991)
(copyright cannot be "totally explained through [utilitarian] efficiency" theory).
189. 1 BOORSTYN, supra note 44, § 1.02, at 1-6 to 1-7 ("[While the immediate effect
of copyright is to grant valuable rights to authors, thereby enabling them to secure a fair
return for their creative efforts, the ultimate aim of this incentive is 'to stimulate artistic
creativity for the general public good.'"); LEAFFER, supra note 46, § 1.6, at 13 (utilitarian
copyright law uses reward to authors merely as "means" to promote "consumer welfare");
PATTERSON & LINDBERG, supra note 93, at 49 (protection of authors' rights is merely in-
strument to promote learning and preserve public domain); Fischer, supra note 92, at 1687-
91 (stating that Constitution's Patent and Copyright Clause "emphasizes the maintenance of
incentives for creativity," reflecting the "primary theme" of "utilitarianism"); Robert A.
Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2
(1995) ("Copyright's raison d'etre is to benefit the public by encouraging the production and
dissemination of new copyrighted works."); Lacey, supra note 111, at 1540-41 (copyright
exists to further public purpose - not to protect artists' natural rights); Leval, supra note
87, at 1108-09 (Copyright Clause's granting of copyright "'for limited times' confirms that
it was not seen as an absolute or moral right, inherent in natural law"); Nance, supra note
178, at 764 ("American intellectual property law is imbued with a consequentialist tone
reflected in our constitutional language."); Yen, supra note 188, at 81 ("Courts have
traditionally viewed copyright as an instrument for encouraging creative activity."); see also
Friedman, supra note 178, at 159 ("[lit seems that copyright protection is not an intrinsically
good natural right, but rather a goyernment-granted privilege instrumental to the achieve-
ment of good consequences."); Tal Vigderson, Note, Hamlet 1I: The Sequel? The Rights of
Authors vs. Computer-Generated "Read-Alike" Works, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 401, 433-34
(1994) ("The philosophy behind intellectual property law in the United States is based on
a utilitarian theory that is conceptually opposed to moral rights."). Perhaps not surprisingly,
the Statute of Anne, which most view as the English predecessor to American copyright law,
was also highly utilitarian. See Leval, supra note 92, at 1108-09.
190. See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023, 1029 (1994); Harper & Row
Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985); Sony Corp. v. Universal City
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objective of our copyright laws is not to reward the author, but to secure
for the public the benefits from the creations of authors."I" The Court's
and Congress's observations rest on sound authority - the Constitution's
Patent and Copyright Clause, which describes copyright's goal in distinctly
utilitarian terms: "[t]o promote the Progress of Science. . .by securing for
limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their... Writings. " "
Thus, while both utilitarian and deontological justifications underlie the
Copyright Act, one utilitarian concern predominates - that of providing
authors exclusive rights in their creations so that they will have an eco-
nomic incentive to create works of authorship and thereby benefit the
public.
Like the Copyright Act of which it is an essential part, fair use exists
primarily to further utilitarian goals. Although, no doubt, some deontologi-
cal justifications underlie the doctrine,"9 fair use exists primarily" 4 to
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). The Court in
Wheaton v. Peters made it clear that authors' rights exist in the United States purely by vir-
tue of statutory enactment rather than by virtue of natural rights: "That Congress, in passing
the Act of 1790, did not legislate in reference to existing rights, appears clear .... Con-
gress, then, by this act, instead of sanctioning an existing right. . . created it." Id. at 661.
191. H.R. REP. No. 100-609, at 22 (1988) (report on Berne Convention Implementation
Act).
192. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Patent and Copyright Clause). James Madison, in
Federalist No. 43, noted that "[t]he utility of [Congress's power under the Patent and
Copyright Clause] will scarcely be questioned.... The public good fully coincides in both
cases with the claims of individuals." FEDERALIST No. 43, at 186 (James Madison) (C.
Beard ed., 1959).
193. Some of these articulated deontological bases for fair use include the following:
Fair use exists because certain would-be infringers such as artists and teachers are not
ordinary thieves and "deserve" to use copyrighted works to create additional works. See
Lacey, supra note 111, at 1563. Fair use is a natural-law concept that reflects the authors'
limited right to take from the public domain. See Darr, supra note 92, at 1049 ("While
some claim that fair use is a utilitarian device, others have found in copyright elements of
natural law, Hegelian allocation to facilitate use and the limited power of positive law to
describe rights."); Patterson, supra note 92, at 249 ("The natural law basis of the common
law copyright was ... the source of the fair use doctrine."); Yen, supra note 188, at 108
(arguing that nonutilitarian theories based on individual rights explain application of fair use
to parody). Finally, fair use has a "multiform function" that includes the pursuit of societal
and intuitive fairness. See Weinreb, supra note 87, at 1137.
194. Deontological labor and personality theories do not readily support the fair-use
doctrine. As to the inadequacies of the labor theory, Professor Lacey argues: "The fair use
defense is totally unjustifiable under the Lockean view of property, which does not allow
exceptions to its absolutist proposition that a person must either receive the actual product
of her labor or receive just compensation for it." See Lacey, supra note 111, at 1564. As
to personality theory, Lacey argues: "The personality theory, which many commentators
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pursue the same goal as copyright itself - to promote the creation of new
works of authorship." g Confirming the utilitarian nature of fair use, the
Supreme Court in its most recent fair-use opinion noted: "From the infancy
of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted
materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose,
'[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts ....,""' Fair use
believe makes an even stronger case for possession of intellectual property than for other
types of 'ordinary' property, is equally unhelpful in providing a reason for the fair use
limitation on intellectual property." Id. Professor Lacey perhaps overstates the absolutist
nature of the property rights contemplated by Locke and Hegel. See Gordon, supra note
183, at 1592 (discussing natural-law basis for limiting property rights); Wendy J. Gordon,
Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and the Problem of Private
Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1046 (1990) (arguing that Lockean labor theory does
not support absolute property rights); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright
As Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.I. 517, 553 (arguing that scope of natural-law
property rights is not unlimited). Nevertheless, that the primary justification for fair use is
utilitarian rather than deontological is beyond question.
195. E.g., MAVIS FOWLER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 59 (1996) ("Fair Use is like an
easement or a right of way through private property for the public's benefit."); PATRY,
supra note 52, at 718-19 ("Fair use was adopted by American courts in 1839, operating
under a constitutional goal of promoting 'the Progress of Science.'"); PATTERSON & LIND-
BERG, supra note 93, at 196 ("The role of the fair-use doctrine in copyright is to ensure that
copyright does not become an undue obstacle to learning."); Darr, supra note 92, at 1027
("One purpose of fair use is essentially utilitarian, the creation of new works of independent
significance."); Fischer, supra note 92, at 1687 ("The fair use doctrine enables the judiciary
to permit unauthorized uses of copyrighted works in particular situations when doing so will
result in wider dissemination of those works without seriously eroding the incentives for
artistic and intellectual innovation."); Gordon, supra note 92, at 1657 ("[Flair use is ordi-
narily granted when the market cannot be relied upon to allow socially desirable access to,
and use of, copyrighted works."); Landes & Posner, supra note 111, at 333 (Fair use is an
attempt "to promote economic efficiency by balancing the effect of greater copyright pro-
tection - in encouraging the creation of new works by reducing copying - against the
effect of less protection - in encouraging the creation of new works by reducing the cost
of creating them."); Leval, supra note 87, at 1110 ("Briefly stated, the use [to be a fair use]
must be of a character that serves the copyright objective of stimulating productive thought
and public instruction without excessively diminishing the incentives for creativity.");
Patterson, supra note 92, at 266 (stating that fair use is "a limited easement" given to soci-
ety "to benefit from [the author's] creative efforts"); Posner, supra note 92, at 69 (noting
that fair-use doctrine is "most easily understood in economic terms"); Weinreb, supra note
87, at 1150 ("There is broad agreement that a determination of fair use should depend large-
ly, if not exclusively, on answers to ... questions about the social utility of the secondary
use, which are drawn from utilitarian assumptions about the copyright scheme generally.").
196. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994) (Souter, J.). The
Court similarly observed: "The fair use doctrine thus 'permits [and requires] courts to avoid
rigid application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativ-
ity which that law is designed to foster.'" Id. at 577 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S.
207, 236 (1990)).
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furthers this purpose by permitting the socially desirable use of one work
to create another, thereby bringing about the favorable consequence of an
increased number of works available to the public. Mindful that fair use
must not undermine copyright's greater goal of providing incentives for
original creation, courts invoke the fair-use doctrine only when no reason-
able opportunity exists for the would-be user to obtain a consensual license
from the owner of the copyright in the preexisting work,"9 and only when
the use would not otherwise substantially frustrate copyright's core incen-
tive system.
98
2. Justifications for Federal Moral Rights
In enacting VARA, Congress paid lip service to the same utilitarian
justification underlying copyright, declaring that moral rights would provide
an additional incentive for authors to create new works of authorship. 99
Hence, the House report to VARA declared the rights of integrity and
attribution to be "consistent with the purpose behind the copyright laws and
the Constitutional provision they implement."'  But while Congress
espoused this utilitarian rhetoric, VARA's supporters, and occasionally its
legislative proponents, articulated two nonutilitarian concerns: the need to
promote artistic respect and artifact preservation."0 For example, Repre-
sentative Markey noted the importance of preserving "the integrity of our
artworks as expressions of the creativity of the artist. "I Likewise, Profes-
197. See Gordon, supra note 92, at 1614-15.
198. Id. at 1618-19.
199. Incorrectly characterizing European moral rights as creatures of utility rather than
deontological personality concerns, the House report noted: "The theory of moral rights is
that they result in a climate of artistic worth and honor that encourages the author in the
arduous act of creation." H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 5 (1990) (emphasis added); see also
Sterk, supra note 184, at 1202 ("Even in enacting the Visual Artists' Rights Act, which
extended a form of 'moral rights' protection to works of art, the committee report managed
to articulate an economic justification . . ").
200. H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 5. It may be that attribution and integrity rights will
in fact provide additional incentives for artistic creation. See Lacey, supra note 111, at
1584 ("[Mlany artists care more about protection of the fundamental integrity of their work
than the financial gain the work will realize. This concern may mean that moral rights
actually provide greater incentive for creation of artistic works than copyright protection.").
201. Sterk, supra note 184, at 1202 (while Congress articulated utilitarian justifications,
VARA's advocates "advanced desert-based arguments for expanding copyright protection").
202. H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 6. A proponent of VARA legislation, Weltzin Blix
similarly noted that distortion of works "cheats the public of an accurate account of the
culture of our time." Id. Similarly, Arnold Lehman noted that "the arts are fundamental
to our national character and are among the greatest of our national treasures." Id. at 7.
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sor Ginsburg, who testified before the House subcommittee considering
VARA, noted:
The original or few copies with which the artist was most in contact
embody the artist's "personality" far more closely than subsequent mass
produced images. Accordingly, the physical existence of the original
itself possesses an importance independent from any communication of
its contents by means of copies .... Were the original defaced or
destroyed, we would still have the copies, we would all know what the
work looked like, but, I believe, we would all agree that the original's
loss deprives us of something uniquely valuable.an
The distinctly nonconsequentialist nature of these articulated concerns
becomes clear by comparison with copyright's avowedly utilitarian goal of
promoting the creation of new works.
a. Promoting Artistic Respect
The notion that artists and their art works inherently deserve respect
descends from the deontological Hegelian personality theory that underlies
traditional moral rights.20 That is, the notion of artistic respect stems from
the belief that a work of art is the reification of its creator, and as a result,
to harm the work would be to harm the person of the artist. That artists'
works deserve greater regard than the handiwork of other creators is, like
many deontological principles, somewhat illogical.' One commentator has
observed:
So deeply rooted is our sense that art and authorship are different than
other kinds of market transactions, that it is difficult to realize how
striking a provision this really is. Could we imagine giving a plumber
a control over the pipes she installs even after the work is paid for, or a
cabinet maker the right to veto the conversion of her writing desk into a
television cabinet? The author is different than other workers, is outside
the ordinary world of work and exchange, precisely because of her
romantic status.206
The House report further states that destruction of art "has a detrimental effect on the artist's
reputation, and... also represents a loss to society." Id. at 16.
203. Id. at 12 (citing H.R. Hearings on the Visual Artists' Rights Act of 1989, supra
note 95, at 4 (statement of Prof. Jane C. Ginsburg)).
204. On Hegelian personality theory, see supra Part II.A.I.
205. On the illogical nature of many nonconsequentialist principles, see generally LEO
KATZ, ILL-GOTTEN GAINS (1996).
206. James D.A. Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the Framers, 37
AM. U.L. REv. 625, 629 (1988).
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This nonutilitarian idea of artistic respect "is difficult to explain except as
a legislative expression of unreconstructed faith in the gospel of Romantic
'authorship.' "o7
Despite its questionable rationality, the sentimental image of artist as
romantic genius is firmly entrenched in VARA. VARA primarily protects
works of art that are romantically viewed as "fine art," including paintings,
drawings, and sculptures touched by the hand of the artist208 VARA
expressly excludes "lower" forms of art, such as art appearing in technical
drawings, audiovisual works, magazines, newspapers, computers, and ad-
vertisements.' Moreover, VARA protects the "honor" and "reputation"
of artists.20 No other class of citizens is the beneficiary of federal legisla-
tion explicitly protecting that which has traditionally been protected, if at
all, by state laws regarding the right of publicity, defamation, libel, and
slander. Thus, Congress's effort to protect "fine" artists demonstrates the
underlying nonconsequentialist goal of protecting the sensitive creative
genius.
b. Promoting Artifact Preservation
The notion that artifacts deserve protection from alteration and destruc-
tion likewise reflects deontological thinking. The intrinsic worth of origi-
nals is undeniable.2 1 What visitor to the Louvre has not waited in line to
bend close to the Mona Lisa to see Leonardo's actual brush strokes? Here
was his hand! It is a qualitatively different experience to view in person the
207. Jaszi, supra note 63, at 500; see id. at 497 ("The connection between 'moral
rights' and the complex values associated with the Romantic conception of 'authorship' is
clear."); see also Beyer, supra note 21, at 1027 (arguing that underlying moral rights is
belief that authors are "almighty creators who pour particular meanings into their creations
and therefore inherently have undisputed authority over the uses and interpretations of those
creations"); Boyle, supra note 206, at 629 (observing that "[tihe romantic conception of
authorship" underlies "author's 'moral rights' to control a work").
208. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining "work of visual art"); 2 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 67, § 8D.02[A], at 8D-1 1 ("[Moral rights in the United States display
a pronounced bias in favor of fine artists - painters, sculptors, photographers and the
like."); Sirota, supra note 21, at 473 (tracing VARA's protection of only limited types of
works to "the romantic notion of protecting the struggling author of 'fine art'"). Note that
VARA also protects paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures, and still photographs "produced
for exhibition purposes only" in limited editions of two hundred or fewer copies. See 17
U.S.C. § 101.
209. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
210. Id. § 106A(a)(2); id. § 106A(a)(3)(A).
211. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 12 (1990) (statement of Prof. Jane C. Ginsburg);
Lacey, supra note 111, at 1584 ("[lit is to most people's benefit that an original sculpture
not be altered.").
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canvas painted by Leonardo than it is to see yet another copy. 212 One
philosopher of aesthetics has summed up the difference as follows:
An original drawing... is more valuable than the finest reproduction,
even one all but indistinguishable from it. This is true not merely in the
economic sense that the original is scarce and hence costly. The original
is also more valuable and more exciting aesthetically because our feeling
of intimate contact with the magic power of the creative artist heightens
awareness, sensitivity, and the disposition to respond. Once a work is
known to be a [reproduction], that magic is gone.
213
This, however, is puzzling from a consequentialist perspective. After all,
if a painting of the Mona Lisa and a copy of it are visually indistinguish-
able, then we would expect to enjoy both the same.2 14
But we do not. The difference can be explained only in deontological
terms - the pedigree of an experience matters.1 5 That is, it often matters
more how a physical object came to be, than what its physical attributes
are.216 Consider philosopher Peter Unger's compelling example of a human
reproduction: would a father exchange his eight-year-old daughter for an
indistinguishable molecule-for-molecule clone?217 A consequentialist might
consider the end result to be the same thing and opt for the clone; a deon-
tologist would want his little girl.
212. Perhaps the best evidence of the intrinsic value of originals is the prevalence of art
museums throughout the world. If copies were just as good as originals, then people would
be content simply viewing reproductions of art works. This, however, is not the case.
213. Leonard B. Meyer, Forgery and the Anthropology of Art, in THE FORGER'S ART:
FORGERY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART 77, 86-87 (Denis Dutton ed., 1983).
214. A number of aesthetic philosophers have reached the conclusion that there should
be no difference between the enjoyment one gets from looking at an original work of art and
at a forgery, and "that sheer foolishness is displayed by our behaving as if there were such
a difference." KATZ, supra note 205, at 76. Such philosophers believe that "claiming that
the original is more valuable than a perfect fake is much like George Bernard Shaw's joke
that Wagner's music is better than it sounds." Id. There is, nevertheless, a difference. For
an interesting collection of essays on the aesthetics of forgeries, see THE FORGER'S ART:
FORGERY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART (Denis Dutton ed., 1983).
215. KATZ, supra note 205, at 73-83.
216. Even an otherwise unattractive fragment of broken pre-Columbian pottery is an
enjoyable artifact because of its pedigree - because we know that it was made centuries ago
by the hand of a long-dead artist in the wilds of South America. If a seemingly identical
fragment broke off of a pot made last week by a guy named Al, who would care to see it?
217. PETER UNGER, IDENTrrY, CoNsciousNESS AND VALUE 301-02 (1990) (discussed
in KATZ, supra note 205, at 76-77). The father would decline the swap "[nlot because the
clone is lacking in any attribute that [his] original daughter possesses but just because it isn't
[his] original daughter. It lacks the right pedigree. The same goes for works of art."
UNGER, supra, at 301-02.
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VARA's integrity right exists to further the deontological goal of
preserving originals.2"8 Perhaps most telling in this regard is that VARA,
unlike traditional moral-rights regimes, protects only touched-by-the-artist
originals and not reproduced copies of the works of authorship embodied
in such artifacts.2 19 This suggests that VARA, although concerned about
protecting the artist as romantic genius,' is even more concerned about
protecting artists' originals. After all, the reputation and honor of an artist
presumably could be damaged by the VARA-permitted misattribution or
alteration of a mere copy of his work.
3. The Irreconcilable Conflict Between Justifications
Fair use exists to further copyright's broader consequentialist goal of
promoting the creation of new works of authorship. Thus, fair use and
copyright are working together to further the same utilitarian goal. In
contrast, federal moral rights exist to further the deontological goals of
promoting artistic respect and artifact preservation. Thus, fair use and
federal moral rights, although in the same boat of copyright's Title 17, are
paddling in different directions. Considering this, federal moral rights are
out of place in the utilitarian realm of copyright.' To apply fair use to
limit these rights would be to disregard the deontological goals of VARA. '
Some commentators, however, have suggested that it would be appro-
priate to disregard the deontological goals underlying federal moral rights
in order to further a more important, albeit utilitarian, goal of fair use -
218. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 5 (1990) (VARA "protects both the reputations
of certain visual artists and the works of art they create") (emphasis added); id. at 6 (Represen-
tative Markey stating that preserving "the integrity of our artworks" is "paramount to the
integrity of our culture"); id. at 7 (Weltzin Blix noting that distortion of art "cheats the public
of an accurate account of the culture of our time"); id. at 8 (Arnold Lehman characterizing art
works as "among the greatest of our national treasures"); id. at 12 (Jane Ginsburg opining
"that the original's loss deprives us of something uniquely valuable").
219. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining "work of visual art" to include only original
artifacts).
220. See supra Part I.C.2.a.
221. E.g., Damich, supra note 21, at 388 ("That the artist should have a personal right
based on the act of artistic creation itself seem[s] ... to depart from the utilitarian basis for
copyright protection found in the United States Constitution."); Yonover, "Dissing" of Da
VD, supra note 1, at 1002-03 (noting that Congress in making VARA part of Copyright Act
has attempted "to fit a square peg into a round hole - natural, personal, moral rights into an
economic rights-based copyright scheme"); Yonover, Precarious Balance, supra note 1, at 121
(same).
222. To the extent that VARA's integrity and attribution rights do provide an additional
incentive for authors to create works of authorship, limiting those rights through fair use
undercuts this articulated, if unpersuasive, utilitarian justification.
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that of encouraging the creation of new derivative works, particularly
parodies. These commentators are concerned that unless fair use permits
parodists to violate artists' moral rights, artists will use those rights to
suppress socially beneficial derivative works.2'
These concerns are unfounded. Sacrificing artists' moral rights and the
goals they further would advance none of the utilitarian goals of copyright
and its fair-use doctrine. First, allowing users to violate artists' attribution
and integrity rights would result in the creation of no additional works. If
a person violates an artist's integrity right by, for example, drawing a
mustache on a painting to parody it, the parodist has in effect created a new
work of visual art. But in so doing, he literally and physically has sup-
planted the "old" work. Hence, the net gain from his artistic effort is
zero.' Considering that society receives no net increase in works from
223. See PATRY, supra note 52, at 1049. Patty states:
For parody or satire to succeed, the original must be distorted or modified in a way
that prejudices the original artist's honor or reputation. Authors of works of visual
art who have deliberately sold a copy of their work should not be able to stifle
criticism by resort to VARA.
Id.; see Yonover, "Dissing" of Da Vinci, supra note 1, at 943 (arguing that "fair use, based
on a parody which infringes upon an artist's moral right of integrity, should be given a wide
berth" and that "an artist's moral right of integrity should in most circumstances yield, under
fair use, to the right of the parodist"); Yonover, Precarious Balance, supra note 1, at 85-86
(same); Note, supra note 122, at 1992 (noting that "VARA has the potential to stifle digital
technology in a manner contrary to the constitutional mandate"). Professor Yonover argues
that courts should "presume" parodic infringements of artists' moral rights to be fair, see
Yonover, "Dissing" of Da Vinci, supra note 1, at 990, even though the Supreme Court
recently rejected the use of presumptions to simplify fair-use analyses. See Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583-85 (1994).
Other commentators have expressed concern that traditional, continental moral rights,
if adopted in the United States, might endanger the creation of socially desirable derivative
works, including parodic uses. For this reason, some of these commentators have called for
the application of fair use in order to permit such beneficial uses. See PATrERSON &
LINDBERG, supra note 93, at 176 ("The [traditional] moral-rights doctrine should not, for
example, be used... to inhibit the genres of burlesque, parody and satire."); Kwall, supra
note 21, at 71 (noting that fair-use doctrine "represents a particularly significant limitation on
[traditional] moral rights" and that such limitation is "justifiable as a 'ne essary concomitant'
of living in a democratic society"); Lacey, supra note 111, at 1595 n.267 (stating that artists
should be prevented "from asserting [their] right of integrity to prevent genuine parodies of
[their] work"). These commentators' concerns are warranted in the context of continental,
personality-based moral rights, which can prevent alterations of even reproductions of art
works. If such broad moral rights were recognized in the United States, fair use should permit
the unauthorized creation of desirable derivative works. However, the rights recognized by
VARA are significantly less expansive than traditional moral rights, protecting only original
"works of visual art."
224. The net gain of "works of visual art" is zero. In contrast, the net gain of "works
of authorship" could be one. That is, if a reproduction of the original artist's painting earlier
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such uses, allowing a user to violate federal moral rights does not further
fair use's utilitarian goal of increasing the number of works available to the
public.'
Second, allowing users to violate federal moral rights is unnecessary to
permit the creation of derivative works such as parodies. Permitting unau-
thorized parodic uses of copyrighted works has the beneficial consequence
of encouraging the creation of new derivative works without substantially
eroding the market for (and hence the incentive to create) other works.
Fair use assures that the public is not deprived of such socially desirable
derivative works by uncooperative or unaccessible original authors. It is
unnecessary, however, to limit federal moral rights through the fair-use
doctrine in order to further this utilitarian goal. Rather than harming the
integrity of an original artifact, the parodist could simply copy the underly-
ing work of authorship embodied in the artifact (conduct which may be
permitted by fair use), and then alter that copy to achieve the desired parod-
ic effect (conduct permitted by VARA). The result: a socially desirable
derivative work produced without harm to the VARA-protected original
work of visual art.' Thus, to apply pointlessly the fair-use doctrine to
limit artists' attribution and integrity rights would disregard VARA's deon-
tological goals without furthering any of the utilitarian goals of fair use.
For these reasons, there exists neither a utilitarian nor a deontological
justification for limiting federal moral rights through the fair-use doctrine.
had been fixed in a copy, then arguably there would be two distinct works of authorship after
the drawing of the mustache. However, a more persuasive argument can be made that the
mere drawing of a mustache on the original work of visual art would not result in a new work
of authorship. In order to create a derivative work, one must first reproduce some portion of
the copyrighted work of authorship in a copy. See C.M. Paula Co. v. Logan, 355 F. Supp.
189, 191-92 (N.D. Tex. 1973) (finding no violation of adaptation or distribution right in
cutting decals from copyrighted pictorial art works); LEAFFER, supra note 46, § 8.5, at 228;
1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 67, § 3.03, at 3-13.
225. Put another way, this use is not "productive" because it has not created an additional
work. Nonproductive uses are less likely to be considered fair by courts. See, e.g., Landes
& Posner, supra note 111, at 360.
226. Throughout her. articles, Professor Yonover uses the example of Duchamp's
L.H.O.O.Q. (the mustachioed Mona Lisa) to demonstrate why fair use should foreclose
Leonardo from invoking his VARA integrity right to veto Duchamp's parody. Unless fair use
permits parodic violations of artists' integrity rights, she suggests, parodists will be unable to
create new parodies. See Yonover, "Dissing" of Da Vinci, supra note 1, at 935; Yonover,
Precarious Balance, supra note 1, at 79. However, what Duchamp actually did would not
have violated Leonardo's federal integrity. right. Duchamp did not march into the Louvre with
a can of spray paint and alter the original artifact in the name of fair use. Rather, he altered
a copy, which VARA does, and fair use should, permit. Would Professor Yonover approve
of Duchamp spray painting the real thing when he could have achieved the same parodic effect
by altering a copy?
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That neither consequentialist nor nonconsequentialist reasoning supports a
fair-use limitation on federal moral rights compellingly suggests that those
rights should not be so limited.2
D. The Statutory Fair-Use Factors Are Difficult to Apply
in the Context of Federal Moral Rights
Section 107 of the Copyright Act permits the "fair use of a copyrighted
work" for purposes such as "criticism, comment, news reporting, teach-
ing . . . scholarship, or research."' Furthermore, § 107 sets forth four
"factors" that courts "shall" consider in evaluating the fairness of any par-
ticular use. 9 Although § 107's statutory framework is difficult to apply
in the context of an ordinary copyright infringement action,' it is espe-
cially troublesome in the context of purportedly "fair" violations of federal
attribution and integrity rights.
1. "Using" and "Consuming" VARA-Protected Property
Section 107 authorizes certain "uses" of copyrighted works - it does
not authorize the consumption of such works. When a critic, commentator,
reporter, teacher, scholar, researcher, or parodist utilizes a preexisting
copyrighted work for purposes of criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, scholarship, research, or parody, he does not consume the work
and thereby take it from the copyright holder. Because of the public nature
of the copyrighted work,"1 the copyright holder can still enjoy the work
227. See Nance, supra note 178, at 767 ("[Olur confidence in the justifiability of [an
intellectual property institution] should depend upon the existence and convergence of coherent
deontological and consequentialist theories that support the rights in question .... "); see also
Randy E. Barnett, Of Chickens and Eggs - The Compatibility of Moral Rights and Conse-
quentialist Analyses, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 611, 615-16 (1989). Barnett states:
[I]f both methods [consequentialist and nonconsequentialist] generally reach the
same result in entirely different ways, then each method can provide an analytic
check on the other. Because any of our analytic methods may err or may be used
to deceive, we can use one method to confirm the results that appear to be sup-
ported by the other.
Id.
228. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994) (preamble). In enacting § 107 as part of the 1976 Copyright
Act, Congress purportedly sought to "restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to
change, narrow or enlarge it in any way." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976); S. REP.
No. 94-473, at 62 (1975); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576-
77 (1994) (citing House and Senate reports).
229. See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
230. See supra Part II.B.
231. See supra Part fLI.A.1.
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himself irrespective of another's simultaneous use. Moreover, because fair
uses are typically those that do not appreciably harm the copyright owner's
market for the work, 2 a fair use does not deprive the copyright owner of
that which the Copyright Act is fundamentally designed to protect - the
economic market for his copyrighted work of authorship. For these reasons,
a fair use of a copyrighted work does not constitute a consumption of the
work, but rather is a mere use as explicitly contemplated by § 107.
In contrast, if a critic, commentator, reporter, teacher, scholar, re-
searcher, or parodist were to utilize a preexisting work of visual art - rather
than a work of authorship - in a manner inconsistent with VARA, he in
effect would be consuming rather than "using" the work of visual art. For
example, any purported use of a work of visual art by a parodist in violation
of the artist's integrity right would involve the intentional "distortion, mutila-
tion, or other modification" of that artifact. 3 Such a use of the VARA-
protected tangible artifact would deprive the artist of that which Congress
sought to protect - the integrity of his work of visual art. Hence, a purport-
edly fair use of a work of visual art would materially harm the visual artist's
protectable interest in the physical artifact - an interest in maintaining the
integrity of a work even after it leaves his possession. For this reason, a
purportedly fair use of a VARA-protected artifact, irrespective of its pur-
pose, arguably does not constitute a "use" within the meaning of § 107.
2. The Four Fair-Use Factors Applied to Federal Moral Rights
Section 107 enumerates four factors that courts "shall" consider "[i]n
determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is fair
use. "24 These statutory factors include (1) the "purpose and character of the
use," (2) the "nature of the copyrighted work," (3) the "amount and substan-
tiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,"
and (4) the "effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work."' No single factor is dispositive; "[a]ll are to be ex-
plored . . . together, in light of the purposes of copyright."" Although
232. See infra Part m.D.2.d.
233. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3).
234. Id. § 107 (preamble). See generally 3 NmmER & NimMER, supra note 67,
§ 13.05, at 13-150 to 13-195; PATRY, supra note 11, at 413-569.
235. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)-(4) (1994).
236. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) (Souter, J.). To
emphasize that no single factor is dispositive, Congress amended § 107 in 1992 to state:
"The fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding
'is made upon consideration of all the above factors." See Act of Oct. 24, 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145, 3145 (amending 17 U.S.C. § 107).
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courts evaluating fair-use issues must consider all four statutory factors,
courts are not limited to them and may weigh other relevant considera-
tions. 7  Unfortunately, § 107 gives little guidance regarding how these
factors should be applied generally." It gives even less guidance regarding
how they should be applied to limit federal attribution and integrity rights. 9
a. Purpose and Character of the Use
'The first factor directs courts to consider "the purpose and character of
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes."2' In evaluating the "purpose and character"
of the use, courts may consider, among other things, whether the use is of
a type illustrated in the preamble to § 107, namely, whether the use is for
"purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, ... teaching, schol-
arship or research. " I Although parodic uses are not listed in the preamble,
237. E.g., Brewer v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 749 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1984)
(stating that "section 107 sets forth four nonexcIusive factors"); Triangle Publications, Inc.
v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1175 n.10 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that
"the statute indicates that these four factors are not necessarily exhaustive"); DC Comics,
Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Bus., Inc., 598 F. Supp. 110, 119 n.2 (N.D. Ga. 1984) ("Section
107 does not limit a court to consideration of only the four factors enumerated in the
statute."); see PATRY, supra note 11, at 568-69 (noting that courts have considered other,
unenumerated factors such as "privacy interests, defendant's good faith or lack thereof,
'wrongful denial of exploitative conduct towards the work of another,' commission of error,
and the plaintiff's misuse of his or her copyright to suppress unfavorable comment" (cita-
tions omitted)); Leval, supra note 87, at 1125-30.
238. PATRY, supra note 11, at 414; see also 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 67,
§ 13.05[A], at 13-154 (stating that § 107 "does not, and does not purport to, provide a rule
that may automatically be applied in deciding whether any particular use is 'fair'"); Leval,
supra note 87, at 1105-06 (stating that Copyright Act furnishes "little guidance on how to
recognize fair use"). The Supreme Court has recently stated that the fair-use analysis "is
not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes,
calls for a case-by-case analysis." Campbell, 510 U..S. at 577; see also Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40 (1984) (stating that fair-use analysis
calls for a "sensitive balancing of interests"); id. at 449 n.31 (noting that Congress "es-
chewed a rigid, bright-line approach to fair use").
239. Section 107 merely states that it limits the federal moral rights set forth in § 106A
without articulating how this is so. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). With regard to applying
§ 107 to the rights of integrity and attribution, lawyer Peter Karlen stated as follows during
the congressional hearings on VARA: "I don't see how the factors enumerated at § 107 par-
ticularly relate to these rights of artists." S. Hearings on Moral Rights in Our Copyright
Laws, supra note 96, at 105-06.
240. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1). See generally 3 NIMMER & NMER, supra note 67,
§ 13.05[A][1], at 13-157 to 13-172; PATRY, supra note 11, at 419-504.
241. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79, 584.
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they are favored by the fair-use doctrine.' 4 2  Nevertheless, the fair-use
analysis does not entail merely pigeonholing a use into a particular category.
Rather,
[t]he central purpose of this investigation is to see ... whether the new
work merely "supersede[s] the objects" of the original creation ... or
instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different charac-
ter, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks,
in other words, whether and to what extent the new work is "transforma-
tive."243
Hence, the "more transformative the new work, the less will be the signifi-
cance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a finding
of fair use. "2
The purpose underlying a violation of the federal integrity right often
may fall among the favored types of uses.245 Consider again a purchaser
who buys an oil-on-canvas portrait by a well-known artist and then paints a
mustache on it to poke fun at the work or the artist. Such a parodic use
would be for purposes of criticism or comment and would be among those
favored by § 107(1).246 Moreover, even if the parodist created the parody
to turn a profit, that commercial purpose would not weigh dispositively
against a finding of fair use.'A7 Hence, the purpose prong of § 107(1) might
242. Id. at 579.
243. Id. (citing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901)
(Story, J.); Leval, supra note 87, at 1111).
244. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); see also Leval,
supra note 87, at 1110-16. The Court in Campbell noted the significant weight given to
"transformative" uses in fair-use analyses. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. This is a variation
on an earlier theme in fair-use case law and commentary noting that "productive" uses are
favored by the fair-use doctrine. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 111, at 360.
Landes and Posner state:
A productive use is one that lowers the cost of expression and tends to increase
the number of works, while a reproductive one simply increases the number of
"copies" of a given work, reduces the gross profits of the author, and reduces the
incentives to create works. Not surprisingly, a fair use defense for a productive
use is looked upon more favorably than such a defense for a reproductive use.
Id.
245. Yonover, "Dissing" of Da Vinci, supra note 1, at 998 ("Thus, a parody that
comments upon, targets, or criticizes the original work ... is the special focus of section
107."); Yonover, Precarious Balance, supra note 1, at 117 (same).
246. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 ("We thus line up with the courts that have held
that parody, like other comment or criticism, may claim fair use under § 107.").
247. See id. at 584-85; Yonover, "Dissing" of Da Vinci, supra note 1, at 998; Yonover,
Precarious Balance, supra note 1, at 117.
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sometimes support fair use, at least for purposes of parody, even as applied
to artists' integrity and attribution rights.
However, the § 107(1) analysis does not end with the purpose of the use.
Rather, § 107(1) further directs courts to consider the character of the
defendant's use.' In contrast to the purpose prong of § 107(1), the charac-
ter prong is difficult to apply to prima facie infringements of federal moral
rights. To illustrate the problem, consider the principle articulated by the
Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. that the "more transformative"
the character of the defendant's use, the more likely the fair-use defense will
permit the use.249 In the context of traditional uses of copyrighted works of
authorship, this holding is sensible. After all, the more the subsequent user
modifies his copy of the preexisting work, the less the resulting product will
serve as a market substitute for the original work, and the less will be the
harm to the copyright owner's economic interest in commercially exploiting
the original work of authorship. m
However, in the context of purportedly fair infringements of federal
moral rights, characterizing a VARA-infringing use as "transformative"
should have the opposite effect. That is, the more transformative the VARA-
infringing use - the more the user distorts, mutilates, or modifies the
original artifact - the less fair it should be considered. This is so because
a highly transformative use of the VARA-protected physical artifact makes
the resulting product less true to the touched-by-the-artist artifact. Indeed,
a highly transformative use produces a new work that physically supersedes
the original artifact. Hence, the more transformative the use of an artifact,
the greater the harm to the artist's and the public's deontological interests in
preserving it. 5
Notwithstanding this problem, to the extent that the character prong of
§ 107(1) can be stretched to apply to uses which infringe upon the VARA
integrity right, the character of such uses should weigh against a finding of
fair use. Any prima facie violation of the artist's integrity right necessarily
involves the alteration or destruction of an original artifact. At a visceral
level, such a destructive use is of a materially different "character" from a
248. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1994).
249. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
250. See id.; Leval, supra note 87, at 1111-16.
251. For similar reasons, the alteration of an original work of visual art is not a use of
a "productive" character. See supra note 244 (distinguishing productive use from reproduc-
tive use). Although altering an artifact essentially produces a "new" one, it does so at the
expense of the original; that is, it physically supersedes the original. Therefore, there is no
net gain in the number of works available to the public. Given that such a use has not
netted the public additional works, the use should not be considered "productive."
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constructive one affecting only copies of a work of authorship. I Moreover,
a user can often pursue the same purpose, such as creating a parody, through
a use of a different character. Particularly, the user can simply copy the
work of authorship (leaving the original artifact undisturbed), and then
parody it.' In light of this alternative, a use of a destructive character
seems all the less fair.
b. Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second factor directs courts to consider "the nature of the copy-
righted work."' This factor, according to the Supreme Court, "calls for
recognition that some works are closer to the core of intended copyright
protection than others."' Creative, expressive, entertaining works, such as
works of art and fiction, are closer to copyright's core than are factual works
such as histories, biographies, and scientific works. As a result, the fair-use
doctrine tends to permit wider use of factual works than creative ones, 256
partly because the enforcement of exclusive rights in factual works is be-
lieved to pose a greater risk of inhibiting the dissemination of important
information than does the enforcement of such rights in fiction.'
As is the case with factor one, Congress did not draft the second factor
with federal moral rights in mind. 8 Thus, the "copyrighted work" to which
this factor refers is obviously the intangible "work of authorship" protected
by the Copyright Act - not the tangible "work of visual art" protected by
VARA. Nevertheless, to the extent that this second factor is applicable in
the context of VARA rights, it should consistently weigh against a finding
of fair use. After all, VARA-protected works of visual art will almost
always be highly creative and expressive works rather than works of a bio-
graphical, scientific, historical, or reportorial nature. Indeed, VARA specifi-
cally excludes a number of works of a scientific or technical nature (such as
maps, globes, charts, and technical drawings), 259 and a number of works with
252. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (statements of Prof. Ginsburg and
Mr. Karlen).
253. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
254. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1994). See generally 3 NIMMER & NnIMER, supra note 67,
§ 13.05[a][2], at 13-172 to 13-183; PATRY, supra note 11, at 504-49.
255. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
256. E.g., 3 NIMMER&NIMMER, supra note 67, § 13.05[A][2][a], at 13-172 to 13-177.
257. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 80, § 10.2.2.2, at 226.
258. Indeed, it was drafted nearly fifteen years before Congress adopted attribution and
integrity rights in VARA.
259. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining "work of visual art").
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a high potential for being of a factual nature (such as books, magazines,
newspapers, periodicals, and databases).' ° Therefore, considering that the
limited types of works protected by VARA26 are near the "core" of intended
copyright protection, they are of a type less susceptible to fair use. 2
c. Amount and Substantiality of the Copyrighted Work Used
The third factor directs courts to consider "the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole."3 This
factor calls for an evaluation of both the "quantity" and the "quality" of what
the defendant used.' Generally, the greater the percentage of the copy-
righted work used, the less likely it is that the defendant's use will be consid-
ered fair.m However, "[q]ualitative measures outweigh quantitative mea-
sures" in this determination, 2 especially considering that even the use of a
small percentage of a copyrighted work will not be fair if the portion that the
defendant used constituted the "heart" of the copyrighted work.'
This factor, unlike the other three, is somewhat easier to apply to the
fair use of VARA-protected works.6 8 That is, the greater the extent of the
user's alteration of the original artifact - the more he takes - the less likely
that the use will be considered fair. If the user alters only a small portion
of a relatively unimportant part of the work of visual art (for example, a
purchaser slightly recolors a tree in the background of a portrait), then it is
more likely that the use should be considered fair. Conversely, if the user
260. See id.
261. During congressional hearings, Representative Markey noted that Congress went
"to extreme lengths to very narrowly define the works of art that [are] covered." H.R. REP.
No. 101-514, at 11 (1990).
262. The amount of weight this factor carries in a fair-use analysis in the context of
parody is questionable. The Court in Campbell noted that this factor was not much help "in
separating the fair use sheep from the infringing goats" in parody cases "since parodies
almost invariably copy publicly known, expressive works." Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994). More generally, Nimmer has opined that "this second
factor more typically recedes into insignificance in the greater fair use calculus." 3 NmMER
& NIMMER, supra note 67, § 13.05[A][2][a], at 13-172 to 13-173.
263. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1994). See generally 3 NAMER & NMER, supra note 67,
§ 13.05[A][3], at 13-183 to 13-184; PATRY, supra note 11, at 549-55.
264. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 67, § 13.05[A][3], at 13-183 to 13-184.
265. GOLDSTEN, supra note 80, § 10.2.2.3, at 230.
266. Id. at 231.
267. See Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 569 (1985).
268. Note that the reference to "the copyrighted work" in § 107(3), like the reference
in § 107(2), is undoubtedly a reference to the intellectual work of authorship embodied in
the VARA-protected artifact - it is not a reference to the "work of visual art" itself.
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alters a large portion of an important part of the artifact (for example, a
purchaser paints a mustache on the depicted subject's face), then it is less
likely that the use should be considered fair.
d. Effect of the Use on the Market for Copyrighted Work
The fourth factor directs courts to consider "the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." 9 This factor
requires courts to consider not only the extent of market harm caused by the
defendant's conduct, but also "'whether unrestricted and widespread conduct
of the sort engaged in by the defendant ... would result in a substantially
adverse impact on the potential market' for the original." I Although some
courts have characterized this factor as "the single most important element
of fair use" 1 and have branded as "presumptively unfair" commercial uses
that adversely affect the market for the preexisting copyrighted work,' the
Supreme Court's most recent fair-use opinion m rejects the use of formulaic
presumptions and confirms that this factor, "no less than the other three, may
be addressed only through a 'sensitive balancing of interests.'"" Notwith-
standing its role as but one of four considerations, the fourth factor remains
critically important: the Court noted that a defendant relying on a fair-use
defense would "have difficulty carrying the burden of demonstrating fair use
without favorable evidence about relevant markets."275
Like factors one and two, the fourth is much more difficult to apply to
uses of VARA-protected artifacts 6 than to uses of copyrighted works of
269. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1994). See generally 3 NimMER & NIMMER, supra note 67,
§ 13.05[A][4], at 13-184 to 13-191; PATRY, supra note 11, at 555-69.
270. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (quoting
3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 67, § 13.05[A][4] and citing Nation, 471 U.S. at 569;
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901); S. REP. No. 94-
473, at 65 (1975)).
271. E.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990) (dictum); Nation, 471 U.S. at
566 (dictum).
272. E.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984).
273. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569.
274. Id. at 590 n.21 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 594
("No ... evidentiary presumption is available to address ... the fourth [factor], market
harm, in determining whether a transformative use.., is a fair one.").
275. Id. at 590.
276. Even a commentator who proposes that fair use be given "wide berth" in the
context of VARA-protected rights acknowledges that "it is difficult to apply this fourth fair
use factor to a right of integrity claim." Yonover, "Dissing" of Da Vinci, supra note 1, at
1000; Yonover, Precarious Balance, supra note 1, at 119. Section 107(4) focuses upon
"hits on [the artist's] pocket, .not upon attacks on his artistic sensibilities of honor and
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authorship.'m First, it is difficult to identify the relevant market to analyze
for purposes of determining the market effect of a VARA-infringing use of
a protected artifact. The fourth factor exists to assure that the defendant's
use will not "substantially harm" the market for the copyrighted work of
authorship and hence impair "the important economic incentive to the cre-
ation of originals."' Is the relevant market to analyze in the context of
moral rights the market for the copyrighted work? If so, then this factor
peculiarly would consider the effect of an alteration to a tangible artifact on
the market for an entirely different thing, namely the market for the intangi-
ble work of authorship. Or is the relevant market the market for the artists'
federal moral rights, as contrasted with the market for the work of author-
ship? This is unlikely, however, given that no such market exists: federal
moral rights cannot be transferred. 9 Or is the relevant market the market
for the tangible artifact that has been altered? This, too, is unlikely, given
that § 107(4) identifies the relevant market as the market for the "copyrighted
work." But if so, then any mutilation, distortion, or other modification
presumably would by its very nature substantially devalue the original
artifact. Thus, as presently drafted, the reference to a "market" in § 107(4)
simply does not mesh comfortably with the facts to be analyzed in the
context of a VARA-infringing use.
Finally, unlike the fourth fair-use factor (and copyright law in general),
VARA simply does not exist to protect a market. Rather, it exists to protect
authors and their artifacts.m Therefore, even if a relevant market could be
identified for analytical purposes, any market effect of a mutilation, distor-
tion, or alteration of an artifact should be an irrelevant consideration in
assessing the fairness of such conduct. 1 For these reasons, it is difficult to
reputation." Yonover, "Dissing" of Da Vinci, supra note 1, at 1000; Yonover, Precarious
Balance, supra note 1, at 119.
277. Like the second and third factors, the fourth factor also makes explicit reference
to the "copyrighted work" rather than to the physically and conceptually distinct "work of
visual art" that is protected by VARA. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1994).
278. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 593 (1994).
279. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e); Jaszi, supra note 63, at 497 ("[Moral rights (unlike
other copyright interests) are not in the market place; they are inalienable, although subject
to waiver in particular instances.").
280. See supra Part IH.C.2.
281. Cf. Leval, supra note 87, at 1124. Leval notes:
The Court's recognition of the importance of this factor underlies, once again,
that the copyright is not a natural right inherent in authorship. If it were, the
impact on market values would be irrelevant; any unauthorized taking would be
obnoxious. The utilitarian concept underlying the copyright promises authors the
opportunity to realize rewards in order to encourage them to create. A second-
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apply factor four, just as it is difficult to apply factors one and two, to
VARA-mfrmging uses of protected tangible artifacts.
IV Conclusion
The federal moral rights created by Congress m VARA are inherently
incompatible with copyright's fair-use doctrine. Although federal moral
rights are rights in tangible art objects, fair use does not affect rights in
tangible things. Although federal moral rights are distinctly personal in
nature, fair use typically limits more unpersonal economic rights. Although
federal moral rights exist to further the deontological goals of promoting
artistic respect and artifact preservation, fair use exists to further copyright's
utilitarian goal of increasing the number of works of authorship available to
the public. Finally, the statutory fair-use factors set forth in § 107 of the
Copyright Act simply do not work when applied m the context of federal
moral rights.
Despite this doctrinal and practical incompatibility, fair use remains an
explicit statutory limitation on federal moral rights.' Nevertheless, courts
considering fair-use claims m moral-rights cases" should decline Congress's
invitation to so limit artists' integrity and attribution rights. Limiting these
rights through fair use would disregard the nonconsequentialist goals of
promoting artistic respect and furthering artifact preservation, which drove
Congress in 1990 to recognize federal moral rights in the first place. Con-
sidermg that artists' federal integrity and attribution rights, properly under-
stood, are no barrier to the creation of derivative works from preexisting
ones, limiting artists' rights in the name of fair use would further none of the
goals of copyright while ignoring completely those which drove Congress to
adopt federal moral rights.
ary use that interferes excessively with an author's incentives subverts the aims
of copyright. Hence the importance of the market factor.
Id.
282. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(a), 107
283. Although VARA has only been m effect for approximately six years, a number of
federal courts have handled cases presenting VARA issues. See generally, e.g., Dielsi v
Falk, 916 F Supp. 985 (C.D. Cal. 1996); Choe v Fordham Univ Sch. of Law, 920 F
Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y 1995); Carter v Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y
1994), aff'd m part, rev'd m part, and vacated in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995); Gegen-
huber v Hystopolis Prods., Inc., No. 92-C-055, 1992 WL 168836 (N.D. Ill. July 13,
1992).
